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Abstract
This thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding and measurement of the aggregate macroe-
conomic risks that drive security prices, via three empirical studies. Following Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2002), Chapter 2 examines a wide cross-section of global equity markets to
test the hypothesis that not only do deviations from fundamentals occur, but it is optimal for
an arbitrageur to delay trades that would correct the mispricing. The evidence supports the
hypothesis that market prices can and do experience sustained deviations from fundamentals
despite the presence of arbitrageurs. Chapter 3 examines the tangled evidence that relates
firm-level financial distress to the market, size and value factors of Fama and French (1996).
Using panel data it is then shown that exposure to the Fama-French factors can be linked to
distress risk, which demonstrates a link between priced aggregate macroeconomic risks and the
financial performance of individual firms. Frazzini & Pedersen (2013)’s Betting-Against-Beta
(BAB) factor is theorized to occur due to the leverage constraints of a subset of the population
of investors. Chapter 4 demonstrates that in the post-1990 subsample the premium on the
BAB factor is significantly diminished. Furthermore a conditional model using Carhart (1997)’s
4-factors reduces the alpha further, suggesting that part of the anomaly is in fact attributable
to conditional exposure to existing factors, rather than market frictions.
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”The CAPM and its successor factor models are paradigms of the absolute approach. Yet in
applications, they price assets ”relative” to the market or other risk factors, without answering
what determines the market or factor risk premia and betas... The central and unfinished task of
absolute asset pricing is to understand and measure the sources of aggregate or macroeconomic
risk that drive asset prices. Of course, this is also the central question of macroeconomics,
and this is a particularly exciting time for researchers who want to answer these fundamental
questions in macroeconomics and finance. For example, expected returns vary across time
and across assets in ways that are linked to macroeconomic variables, or variables that also
forecast macroeconomic events; a wide class of models suggests that a ”recession” or ”financial
distress” factor lies behind many asset prices.” - Cochrane (2005).
The relationship between fundamental macroeconomic risks and security prices is of paramount
importance to finance. However in practice both the Capital Asset Pricing Model1 and Black-
Scholes equation2 price assets relative to other assets, leaving aside the role of economic
fundamentals. The Fama and French (1996) and Carhart (1997) models advance on the
CAPM by using portfolios of stocks sorted on firm characteristics as additional factors, but
this raises even more questions about the relationship between economic fundamentals and
security prices, as it becomes necessary to explain what aggregate macroeconomic risks are
proxied by the sorted portfolios. Accordingly there have been many attempts to relate security
prices to economic fundamentals, and this thesis aims to contribute to that stream of literature.
Chapter 2 investigates the evidence for limited arbitrage in global equity markets. In the
classical theory of finance, arbitrage has the effect of equalizing market prices to fundamental
values thus keeping markets efficient. Moreover Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965) suggest
1Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).
2Black and Scholes (1973).
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that even in the presence of irrational investors, the actions of rational arbitrageurs will drive
prices close to fundamental values. However this argument assumes that arbitrageurs are well-
resourced and unconstrained. There is a stream of literature that relaxes these assumptions
and considers how arbitrage might be limited in practice. If arbitrage is limited, this has major
consequences for any attempt to theoretically link economic fundamentals to market prices. It
would mean that even if there were a model used by rational arbitrageurs with homogenous
beliefs to price securities as a function of economic fundamentals, it would remain possible for
market prices to deviate from these fundamental prices in a sustained way.
In markets that are incomplete arbitrageurs are never able to fully hedge the risk in a
position involving a mispriced asset, which prevents them from taking unbounded positions
to correct mispricings. This has two consequences, namely fundamental risk and noise trader
risk. The former is where the fundamental value of a partially hedged portfolio may change
over time, or arbitrageurs may find that their model doesn’t coincide with the true data-
generating process. This causes the arbitrageur to suffer losses even if they are able to sustain
the strategy until the final payoff is realized [Wurgler and Zhuravskay (2002)]. Shiller (1984)
and Campbell and Kyle (1987) show that fundamental risk can severely limit arbitrage even
when arbitrageurs have infinite horizons. Noise trader risk is where behavioural traders push
prices away from fundamentals, and constrained arbitrageurs cannot correct the mispricing
immediately. This may cause arbitrageurs to suffer losses if they are forced to liquidate early
[DeLong et al (1990a)]. Consequently if markets are not complete, the presence of some
rational arbitrageurs is not enough to correct the mispricings arising from behavioural traders,
contrary to the efficient markets hypothesis.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that professional arbitrage is often conducted by specialists
using other people’s capital. These rational arbitrageurs might find it optimal to delay taking
corrective bets because of the risk that the mispricing worsens during their performance evalua-
tion horizon, leading to underperformance and fund outflows due to the agency problem. Such
an outcome could also leave them without capital precisely when the arbitrage opportunities
are best. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) assume that each individual arbitrageur has finite
resources, and therefore more than one arbitrageur needs to make a corrective trade before
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any mispricing is removed. In this setting, if any individual arbitrageur is uncertain about
when their peers will make their corrective trades, this can incentivize the individual to delay,
and since in equilibrium everyone delays, the mispricing persists. I investigate the evidence for
limited arbitrage in global equity markets in the context of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002)’s
model. I find evidence that supports the hypothesis that market prices can and do experience
sustained deviations from fundamentals despite the presence of arbitrageurs. This is highly
consequential to the task of understanding and measuring how economic fundamentals affect
security prices. If market valuations are prone to diverge from fundamental values in a sus-
tained way, this makes it more challenging to identify the relationship between security prices
and fundamentals.
Chapter 3 investigates whether a stock’s factor loadings from the Fama and French (1996)
model are related to firm-level financial distress. Fama and French3 originally proposed their
multifactor model as a way to enhance the CAPM, following the identification of a num-
ber of anomalies. These anomalies included the size effect of Banz (1981), the leverage
effect of Bhandari (1988), the book-to-market effect of Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid
and Lanstein (1985), and the earnings-price effect of Basu (1983). By including long-short
portfolios of stocks sorted on characteristics, SMB and HML, Fama and French’s enhanced
multifactor model offered to solve all of these anomalies. Empirically the model worked well
in pricing portfolios of stocks sorted according to characteristics. However the success of the
model made it important to identify what aggregate macroeconomic risks the SMB and HML
factors proxied for. In the CAPM the market return serves as a proxy for returns to the wealth
portfolio, which is of hedging concern to investors. Consequently economic theory tells us that
the more a security covaries with the market return, the higher the risk premium required by
rational risk averse investors. Since the inclusion of SMB and HML in a factor model prices
a wider range of portfolios, they must proxy for exposure to aggregate risk factors of hedging
concern to investors as well.
Petkova (2006), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Vassalou (2003) and Liew and Vassalou
(2000) relate HML and SMB to the future state of the economy and the investment opportunity
3Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995 and 1996).
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set. Zhang (2005) also links value portfolios to the state of the economy. These studies would
seem to corroborate Fama and French’s suggestion that their model is consistent with a
multifactor version of Merton (1973)’s ICAPM, in which size and book-to-market proxy for
sensitivity to risk factors in returns. These could include unmeasured components of wealth
not captured by the market portfolio such as human capital or debt securities, or changes in the
investment opportunity set. In the ICAPM, the investment opportunity set becomes relevant
to investors because the model advances from the single-period mean-variance optimization
specified by Markowitz (1959) to a multiperiod setting. Since the size and book-to-market
sorted portfolios SMB and HML are themselves sensitive to innovations in the investment
opportunity set, or unmeasured components of wealth, they consequently succeed in pricing
other securities that are sensitive to those risk factors.
However as Cochrane (2005) suggests in the quote that started this chapter, there could be
a financial distress factor behind many asset prices. In fact it was originally Fama and French
(1995) who noted that high book-to-market stocks could be in financial distress due to their
sustained low profitability. Dichev (1998) finds that bankruptcy risk (proxied by Z-score and
O-score) is negatively related to firm size and positively related to book-to-market. Similarly
Campbell et al (2008) find that financially distressed firms have high loadings on the HML
and SMB factors. I use a panel data of stocks to find that high magnitudes of loadings on
the HML and SMB factors are linked to actual incidence of firm-level default. This result
links firm-level financial performance to the aggregate risks that Petkova (2006), Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001), Vassalou (2003) and Liew and Vassalou (2000) argue lie behind the Fama
and French (1996) factors. Stock returns are sensitive to these aggregate macroeconomic risks
when their fundamental financial performance is poor and they are at risk of bankruptcy.
Chapter 4 returns to the CAPM, which of course predicts that the expected excess return
on a stock is linearly related to its beta on the market excess return. Frazzini and Pedersen
(2013) show that for a sample of US equities 1926-2012, the risk-adjusted returns on portfolios
of stocks sorted according to their CAPM beta are monotonically decreasing as the portfolio
beta increases. Moreover Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2010, 2013) show that the geometric
mean return on portfolios sorted into quintiles according to their CAPM beta is monotonically
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decreasing as the portfolio beta increases. These findings are at odds with Sharpe (1964) and
Lintner (1965)’s CAPM, and are consistent with a flatter security market line (SML) as in
Black (1972).
Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) suggest that a flatter SML is observed empirically because
investors are constrained in the leverage that they can use. One of the assumptions used in
deriving the CAPM is that investors are free to lend or borrow at the risk-free rate, while in
practice many investors, such as individuals, pension funds and mutual funds, are constrained in
the leverage that they can use. Their model incorporates this friction and predicts that leverage-
constrained agents overweight high-beta assets, resulting in lower returns on those assets
compared to the predictions of the frictionless CAPM. They propose a trading strategy involving
long positions in low-beta assets matched with short positions in high-beta assets, and denote
this the ”Betting-Against-Beta” factor. Hong and Sraer (2012) instead suggest that when
investors disagree about the common factor in firm cash-flows, high beta stocks experience a
greater divergence of opinion about their payoffs, and due to short-sales constraints the high
beta stocks remain overpriced. It is interesting to note that both explanations for the anomaly
require us to relax our assumptions about frictions in the derivation of the CAPM.
I investigate how the Betting-Against-Beta factor performs during subsamples, and find
that for the 1990-2012 subsample the anomalous returns on the portfolio disappear. The
structural break in the data is coincident with a rise in hedge fund AUM, see for example Fung
and Hsieh (1999, Table 1). This is consistent with Frazzini and Pedersen’s leverage-based
explanation for the anomaly. This emphasises the importance of frictions when it comes to
relating fundamentals to security prices. By neglecting the leverage constraint of investors,
the classic CAPM overstates the risk-reward offered by high beta stocks.
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Chapter 2
Evidence for Limited Arbitrage in Global Equity Markets
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) present a model for limited arbitrage in which synchronization
risk leads to the persistence of mispricings caused by behavioural traders. Using price-earnings
ratios I identify mispricings in global equity markets, and demonstrate that a simple systematic
timing strategy outperforms naive attempts to correct the mispricing. The evidence is that
sustained deviations from fundamentals occur in equity markets. This study provides empir-
ical evidence to support the modification of AB (2003) to include a parameter controlling
preferences towards synchronization risk.
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I. Introduction
There are well documented cases where the market prices of financial assets have been observed
to deviate from their fundamental values in a sustained manner. Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2002, henceforth AB (2002)) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) provide some interesting
examples. This contrasts with the efficient market hypothesis, which in its semi-strong form
states that market prices reflect all publicly available information [Fama (1965)]. Asset price
bubbles may be regarded as extreme cases of mispricings, and the recent credit and housing
bubbles are a clear reminder of the propensity for such mispricings to occur and their importance
to the real economy. Accordingly, there are a number of theories for how deviations between
market and fundamental values might arise. Shiller (2000) famously suggested that irrational
exuberance arising from ”new economy” thinking was the key explanation for the tech bubble
of the late 1990s. In Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) heterogeneous beliefs and short sales
constraints result in overpricing. Ofek and Richardson (2003) argue that in the presence of
short-sale restrictions, the market clearing price is equated to the demand price of the optimistic
agents since pessimists’ opinions have a limited price impact. Allen et al (2006), DeLong et
al (1990a) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) explore how higher-order beliefs can cause
agents to buy at prices that exceed their own fundamental valuations, since they expect to be
able to sell to other agents for an even higher price. DeMarzo et al (2008) explore how relative
wealth effects can induce herding into risky securities.
In the limits to arbitrage literature, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) describe how rational arbi-
trageurs who are aware of a mispricing may delay taking a corrective bet because of the risk
that the mispricing worsens during their performance evaluation horizon, leading to underper-
formance and fund outflows due to the agency problem. This would leave them without capital
precisely when the arbitrage opportunities are best. In AB (2002) arbitrageurs become sequen-
tially aware that the market price has deviated from fundamental value, but coordination from
a sufficient number of arbitrageurs is required to endogenously correct the mispricing. Since
arbitrageurs do not know who else is aware of the mispricing, they do not know whether a
sufficient mass of their peers are informed to correct a mispricing. As a result they are exposed
to synchronization risk if they naively trade to correct the mispricing too early. Synchroniza-
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tion risk and the costs of carry induce the informed set of arbitrageurs to delay their corrective
trades and implement a timing strategy, thereby prolonging the mispricing.
This study is about mispricings in financial markets as described in AB (2002). Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003, henceforth AB (2003)) apply the principles of synchronization risk to the
special case of bubbles. In AB (2003) the incentive for arbitrageurs to time the market is due
to the higher growth rate enjoyed during the bubble regime, while in AB (2002) the incentive
comes from the costs of carry and loss of diversification that occur when the arbitrageurs take
on an arbitrage position. In AB (2003) bubbles exhibit a temporarily higher price growth rate,
while in AB (2002) mispricings occur due to a discrete shock to market value. These mechanical
differences aside, AB (2003) can be interpreted as a special case of AB (2002). In this chapter
I empirically identify episodes where market values have strayed above fundamental values.
These episodes are characterised by market returns that are ex ante predictably negative.
Because the empirical sample comprises overpricings, it becomes most elegant to use AB
(2003) rather than AB (2002) as the theoretical model in this study. Empirical results in
Section VII do suggest that the overpricing episodes studied result from a temporarily higher
price growth rate, matching the specification of the price path given in AB (2003). But
nonetheless the modelling choice comes with the caveat that there are differences between AB
(2002) and AB (2003) as noted above.
I examine aggregate equity indices from 47 different countries and identify overpricing
episodes using their ex ante cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratios (CAPE). Valuation metrics
such as price-earnings ratios are a cornerstone of fundamental stock analysis [Graham and Dodd
(1934), Shiller (2000), etc.], and so it is reasonable to assume that they should be regarded as
information generators of relevance to market prices. I take the time series of returns observed
during the overpricing episodes, and test the optimality of five different trading strategies.
Each strategy assumes that the arbitrageur is initially long in the market, and can choose
between the market and the local risk-free asset. Three of these strategies delay betting on
a return to fundamentals, aiming to profit from the higher price appreciation rates offered
during the overpricing regime before timing their exit by following market signals. One of
the strategies immediately sells out of the market, and the final strategy remains long in
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the market. The null hypothesis is that it is optimal for an arbitrageur to bet on a return
to fundamentals immediately following the identification of an overpricing. However a simple
market-timing strategy is found to offer robust and statistically significant risk-adjusted returns
that are superior to holding the index, or naively selling the index immediately. These results
are consistent with AB (2002, 2003), thus corroborating the existence of synchronization risk.
This chapter has a number of similarities with Guenster and Kole (2013, henceforth GK).
GK use standard factor models4 to identify bubbles in the Fama and French US industry
portfolios from 1964 to 2009. They empirically investigate the optimal strategy of a utility-
maximising investor who has the choice between a bubbly industry portfolio and the broader
market, and find that investors with horizons longer than 6 months should short the asset
bubble, but if investors can rebalance their portfolios within 4 months or less it becomes optimal
to ride the bubble. There are some key methodological differences when compared to the study
documented in this chapter. GK use factor models to identify bubbles in US industries, while
I use CAPE ratios to identify overpriced global stock indices. GK give the investor a choice
between holding the bubbly industry portfolio or the broader market, while I give the investor
a choice between the local risk-free asset and the local overpriced market. Both studies use a
Markov-regime switching model to capture the different phases of the overpricing, but while
GK have their investor make a probabilistic inference about the existence of the bubble, I
assume that the investor becomes certain of the existence of the overpricing, as in AB (2003).
GK predict the optimal decision by maximizing the investor’s utility using the distributional
parameters of returns, while I calculate the returns that would result from different strategies,
and compare the realized utilities to evaluate which choice is optimal. Nonetheless despite
their differences, both studies arrive at similar results.
This study also provides empirical evidence to support the modification of AB (2003) to
include a parameter controlling preferences towards synchronization risk. As well as deepening
our understanding of the mechanics of limited arbitrage, this work therefore aims to clarify the
theoretical channel via which policy-makers could improve market efficiency, i.e. by influencing
arbitrageurs’ preference towards synchronization risk.
4Such as the CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor model and Carhart (1997)’s 4-factor model.
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II. Data Collection
Daily market price observations for aggregate stock market indices were taken from Datastream
for a sample of 47 different countries, along with their associated earnings and dividends.
The sample includes but is not limited to the G20, Western Europe, South America and the
developed East Asian economies. In each case the maximum available time series was selected.
While developed markets such as the UK, Germany, Australia and the United States have
aggregate earnings data available from 1st January 1973, emerging and developing economies
such as Brazil and Pakistan have earnings data that only begins in the early 1990s. The time
span of the entire study therefore covers 1st January 1973 till 31st December 2010, but not
all countries have data available for the entire period.
Further to this, a local low risk lending rate was obtained from Datastream for each
country in the study. The aim here was to obtain a proxy for the local risk-free rate, or the
opportunity cost of capital. In the vast majority of cases the rate used was the local short-
term interbank rate, but for the following cases the secondary market yield on local short-term
government debt was used instead: the United States, Canada, Egypt, Israel, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Singapore and the UK. Where a choice between the
two was available, the rate deemed to contain the lowest risk was chosen. For many countries
low risk lending rate data only becomes available after 1st January 1973, but these gaps in the
data only coincided with identified mispricing episodes (please see the next section for more
details) in two cases, both occurring in the in-sample of Version 2 of the study (more on that
later). Please see Appendix 1A for details on how rates were backcasted to fill in these gaps.
Finally, World Bank GDP deflators (also from Datastream) were used to construct price
levels for each country in the study. The GDP deflator was used in order to obtain a comparable
price level measure for all countries in the study, covering the entire time span of the study,
1st January 1973 till 31st December 2010. Note that the UK for example does not have CPI
data until 1988.
III. Identifying Mispricing Episodes
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There is an extensive literature that aims to forecast stock market returns using predictive
regressions on state variables such as valuation ratios, interest rates and other financial indica-
tors. Welch and Goyal (2008) re-examine the performance of these models and find that most
are not significant in-sample, let alone out-of-sample. Their conclusion is that such models
would not be useful in helping an investor profitably time the market.
Looking at the S&P Composite Stock Price Index over January 1881 to January 2000,
Shiller (2000) retrospectively identifies mispricing episodes as occurring when the aggregate
price-earnings ratio reaches a local maximum. Note that Shiller uses the 10-year moving
average of real earnings in the denominator of the ratio to correct for the business cycle
and other fluctuations. These are known as cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratios (CAPE).
Intuitively the idea is that for a given level of fundamentals only a certain range of prices can
be supported indefinitely, and a high price-earnings ratio cannot last forever.
A price-earnings ratio can fall for two reasons: either (a) because growth has occurred
and earnings have risen to support the higher prices, or (b) because prices have fallen upon
recognition that earnings will not rise. Nonetheless Shiller’s ex post local maxima all correspond
to acknowledged stock market bubbles. These are the 1901 electricity boom, the 1929 stock
market bubble, the 1966 electronics boom and the 2000 tech bubble. In each case the real
market value of the S&P Composite Stock Price Index can be seen to drop sharply during the
subsequent years. This matches a conventional definition of bubbles as an extended rise in
prices followed by a sharp fall, as in AB (2003). More generally the episodes can be viewed
as overpricings, where market prices exceed fundamental values as in AB (2002). Either way
it seems that periods of growth, where price-earnings ratios are justifiably higher than normal,
are sometimes followed by periods of over-optimism resulting in local maxima. One might
hypothesize that the local peaks correspond to a stage where market participants have in
fact started overreacting to the good news, bidding up prices beyond what is justified by the
fundamentals.
However it is necessary to have ex post information on earnings before we can use Shiller’s
technique. Without this it is not possible to know whether a local maximum is occurring, or
whether the local maximum is going to occur at some later time. In other words, without
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the ex post earnings information it is not possible to know whether a high price-earnings ratio
corresponds to the justified growth phase, or the overpricing phase that sometimes occurs
later. Therefore another technique will be necessary to identify mispricing episodes ex ante,
as is required of the arbitrageurs to be modelled in this study.
There are other issues too. Shiller’s data on the US covers a time-span of considerably
greater length than is available for any of the other 46 countries in the study. Furthermore
the price-earnings ratios of different stock markets have different time series characteristics, as
one might expect given heterogeneity in the cross-section of markets. A consequence of this is
that when identifying mispricings it is not possible to use the same parameters for one country
as the next, without somehow controlling for fixed effects. The main approach used to handle
these issues is described below in section IV. This is the principal version of the study. For
robustness two other versions of the study are also discussed in section VI. To help distinguish
between the different versions of the study, let us denote the principal version as Version 1
(V1), and the two robustness checks as Version 2 (V2) and Version 3 (V3). Throughout, the
information set of the arbitrageur is the same as that of the econometrician. The arbitrageur
sees all countries in the dataset, but only uses those with sufficiently long data series for his
econometric analysis. Although he uses international data, it is assumed that he is running
funds each with a geographic mandate that forces him into a choice between a local stock
market index and a local low risk lending rate. This is a realistic setup since it is typical in the
fund management industry for funds to have a specific geographic mandate.
IV. Method
The time span of the entire study was divided into the in-sample (henceforth, IS), 1st January
1973 till 31st December 1999, and the out-of-sample (henceforth, OOS), 1st January 2000
till 31st December 2010. Note that 19 countries are consequently excluded from this version
of the study altogether, since they lack enough earnings data to have any price-earnings ratios
in-sample. Remember we need the 10-year moving average of real earnings to calculate CAPE
ratios. This leaves us with 28 countries for V1. Although this is not ideal, the advantages of
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this approach will become clear shortly.
For each country in the study a time series of CAPE ratios was calculated. To control
for heterogeneity, the quantile of each observed CAPE ratio was calculated with respect to
the CAPE ratios observed IS for the country in question 5. Of the 28 countries included, 16
have more than 4000 daily CAPE ratio observations IS, and the remainder mostly have more
than 500 observations, although one country does have only 130 observations. Therefore in
general we may be satisfied that there is sufficient IS data for the non-parametric quantile
estimation. Hence for each country the CAPE ratio time series was re-expressed as a time
series of quantiles of CAPE ratios. A priori it was then assumed that if a country’s CAPE
ratio exceeds the 95th quantile for that country, it is possibly in a growth or overpricing phase.
To control for growth situations, each country that exceeds its respective 95th quantile was
then ranked cross-sectionally using its quantile, and the top 2 countries were deemed to have
crossed the threshold into an overpricing episode at the time that they entered the top 2. This
point in time is referred to as episode-start. This process for identifying overpricing episodes
might seem somewhat arbitrary, but note that the results of the study are robust to variation in
the parameters used, and market returns are predictably negative following the identification of
an overpricing episode. This systematic analysis using price-earnings ratios therefore succeeds
as a robust predictor of market returns.
Previously a decision was made to have a uniform cut-off date between the IS and OOS.
This is necessary for the integrity of the cross-sectional comparison. All countries must be
in the IS and OOS phases at the same time. At any time each country’s quantile of CAPE
is calculated using their IS data, so if one country is IS and another OOS at time t, then
the cross-sectional comparison of quantiles would be using information from the future, and
this would be unacceptable for the OOS tests. Although one fix would be to use only the
information up until time t to calculate the quantiles of CAPE at time t, and this would
ensure that no information from the future is used to make the cross-sectional comparison,
5A reasonable concern here is that a change of fundamentals could make the comparison of OOS CAPE
ratios to the distribution of IS CAPE ratios unjustified. By design the CAPE ratio corrects for the
possibility of some fundamental changes, as does the cross-sectional ranking technique discussed on page
22, but nonetheless the caveat remains.
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one significant drawback is that it would lead to very poor estimation of quantiles near the
start of the time series, and since an IS period is required anyway for the parameterization
of the market-timing strategies, this alternative seems like a poor choice. Having a uniform
cut-off date between the IS and OOS therefore ensures that the arbitrageurs being modelled
in the study do not in any way use information from the future when choosing their positions
for the OOS tests.
The cross-sectional ranking technique is appropriate given the openness of the economies
in the sample, and their interdependency due to trade. When growth is expected to occur it
will tend to get priced into more than one market, each of which will then exhibit relatively high
CAPE ratios compared to their own histories. This should not necessarily lead us to believe
that overpricings are occurring in all those countries, and indeed the relative position of the
countries in a list ranked according to the quantile of their CAPE ratio will not change. Crucially
then, just having a historically high CAPE ratio will not necessarily lead to a country being
classed as overpriced. In this way the technique controls for cases where market participants
are reasonably pricing in some expected future growth. However there will be some markets
where participants have over-reacted to the positive signals, and an overpricing episode has
begun. These markets will exhibit higher quantiles than even the other countries who are
in the growth phase. In other words, the markets near the top of the list are the ones that
have a CAPE ratio that is historically high (compared to their own history), but more-so than
anyone else (compared to their history), and it is these countries that I identify as exhibiting
overpricing due to the over-reaction of market participants. There are consequences to this
cross-sectional ranking technique. For a start, it reduces the cross-section from 47 countries
to 28. Moreover, in sections V and VI it will become clear that the results of the study vary
depending on whether or not the technique is applied.
There are theoretical models that specify stock prices to follow a stochastic process, such
as the random walk in Black and Scholes (1973). If stock price processes do have a Brownian
component, it would be possible for a country’s quantile of CAPE ratio to cross the overpricing
threshold repeatedly during short intervals. To avoid the possibility of having dozens of brief
and spurious overpricing episodes, a market is only deemed to have conclusively exited the
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overpricing phase when it has been out of the top 2 for 12 months (261 trading days) or
more. This point in time is referred to as episode-end. After episode-end has occurred, market
participants realize that the point in time 12 months ago when the market last dropped out
of the top 2 was indeed the end of the overpricing, referred to as overpricing-end. These
definitions are summarized below, along with definitions of two other key events, market-peak
and market-bottom:
• EPISODE-START : This is the first point in time at which a country’s quantile of CAPE
ratio exceeds 95% and is ranked in the top 2 cross-sectionally, following either the
beginning of the study or the previous episode-end.
• OVERPRICING-END : This is the point at which a country’s quantile of CAPE ratio either
drops out of the top 2, or ceases to exceed 95%, and stays below those thresholds for
12 months. Hence, market participants are only aware that overpricing-end has occurred
12 months following the event.
• EPISODE-END: This is the point at which a country’s quantile of CAPE ratio has re-
mained below 95% or outside of the top 2 for 12 months. When episode-end occurs,
market participants also become aware that overpricing-end occurred 12 months prior.
• MARKET-PEAK: This is the point over the interval [episode-start, overpricing-end] at
which the nominal market value of the index is highest.
• MARKET-BOTTOM: This is the point over the interval [overpricing-end, episode-end],
at which the nominal market value of the index is lowest. When it comes to evaluating
the optimality of the different strategies, this point in time will be used as the end of
the evaluation period so as to give the null hypothesis the best chance of success.
It is also useful to summarise the four key parameters used in the overpricing identification
system:
• The time between overpricing-end and episode-end: 261 trading days.
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• The threshold for the quantile of CAPE: 95%.
• The growth control, i.e. the maximum number of countries that can cross the threshold
into episode-start status at one time: 2.
• The cut-off date between the in-sample and the out-of-sample: 31st December 1999.
Using this system 20 overpricings were identified IS, and 10 OOS. Please see the graphs of the
OOS overpricing episodes, included as Figures 1 - 9 at the end of this document. The first
dashed line of any pair (red) marks episode-start times, and the second dashed line (green)
marks episode-end times. Remember that when evaluating the different trading strategies, we
are interested in the interval [episode-start, market-bottom], where market-bottom is the point
over the interval [overpricing-end, episode-end] at which the nominal market value of the index
is lowest. Inspection confirms that 18/20 of the IS overpricings have market values at market-
bottom that are lower than at episode-start, and 10/10 for OOS. In other words the systematic
analysis of CAPE ratios reliably predicts negative market returns. Importantly, this method
for overpricing identification works ex ante (in contrast to V2, described later). Although the
choice of parameters is somewhat arbitrary, please see section VI for a description of the work
done on verifying the robustness of the study to variation in these parameters. Moreover, in
the context of AB (2003)’s sequential awareness model, episode-start here represents the point
in time at which an arbitrageur becomes aware of the overpricing. Note that any imprecision in
the overpricing identification method is quite consistent with the model, since it captures how
arbitrageurs in AB (2003) do not necessarily become aware of the overpricing when it begins,
and when they do become aware of the overpricing they do not know with certainty when it
began. The necessary criterion is that the method actually succeeds in identifying overpricing
episodes, and this is satisfied since market returns are predictably negative in 28/30 episodes.
Arbitrageurs initially have a portfolio weight of 1 allocated to the stock market index.
Although the AB model does not consider dividends (Version 3 looks at this more closely),
it is assumed here that while long in the index the flow of dividends is collected in the cash
account, which itself earns the corresponding low risk lending rate for that market. At the
sell-out time the arbitrageur allocates a portfolio weight of 0 to the market and 1 to the cash
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account, which then earns the low risk lending rate indefinitely, or at least until market-bottom
occurs. This restriction of the action space to either 1 (fully long in the market), or 0 (neutral),
arises from Lemma 1 in the AB (2003) model whereby there are no partial purchases or sell
outs. Furthermore the arbitrageurs follow a trigger strategy so that if and when they choose
to sell out of the market, they remain out for the remainder of the overpricing episode. This
property comes from Corollary 1 in the AB (2003) model. Just to clarify, we use slightly
different notation to AB (2003) when describing the action space. Here, 1 denotes a long
position in the market, and 0 denotes a neutral position. The decision on when and if to sell
out is controlled by one of five automated strategies:
1. Strategy 1 sells out of the index immediately following episode-start, switching the port-
folio weight of the index to 0, and allocating a portfolio weight of 1 to the cash account.
In the classical theory the selling pressure of trades such as this is theorized to correct
mispricings, leading to efficient markets [Fama (1965)]. Since this strategy represents
the null hypothesis, a number of choices are made to give it the best chance of success,
so as to make any possible rejection of the null more convincing.
2. Strategy 2 remains long in the market indefinitely, and at least until market-bottom.
This is a simple buy and hold strategy.
3. Strategy 3 attempts to time the market by remaining long, until the point at which the
quantile of CAPE ratio crosses either the upper or lower threshold, xu and xl respectively.
If episode-start was defined simply as the point at which a market crosses its 95th
percentile, then the thresholds could be defined as absolute percentile levels. However
due to the cross-sectional ranking technique, episode-start can occur for any quantile
> 0.95 depending on the relative positions of the countries in the cross-section. The
point at which to sell out must therefore also depend on the quantile of the country at
episode-start. Accordingly the threshold is expressible as the proportional change in the
quantile compared to the quantile at episode-start. E.g. if a market has a quantile of
0.955 at episode-start, and the threshold xu = 1.025, then when the quantile exceeds
0.955× 1.025 = 0.979 the arbitrageur would sell out. If the threshold xu = 1, then the
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arbitrageur would sell out immediately.
4. Strategy 4 attempts to time the market by using a filter rule. It remains long until the
price at time t has dropped by at least p% compared to the maximum value observed
so far over the interval [episode-start, t].
5. Strategy 5 attempts to time the market by using a moving average rule. It remains long
in the market until the current price is at least y% below the moving average of observed
prices, where that moving average is taken over the last δ days.
Strategy 3 uses a similar fundamentals-based rationale as the overpricing identification method-
ology. Strategies 4 and 5 follow Brunnermeier & Nagel (2004)’s observation that hedge funds
may potentially have been using technical signals to forecast the sentiment of less sophisticated
investors during the tech bubble. The parameters xu, xl, p, y and δ are chosen using the IS.
Since a range of market-timing strategies are being used it is appropriate to test for optimality
by using Romano & Wolf (2005)’s Stepwise Multiple Testing, which is a generalization of
White (2000)’s Reality Check that allows multiple hypotheses to be tested. To briefly recap
the Reality Check, let’s assume that the test statistic being used to measure outperformance
of a candidate model vs. the benchmark is asymptotically normal, i.e. f¯ → N(E[f∗], ΩT ).
However in a scenario with M candidate models, the best-performing model’s test statistic
is not actually normally distributed, but follows the distribution maxk=1,....,M f¯k. It would
therefore not be fair to test the best-performing candidate model using a normal distribution,
and indeed White’s test proceeds by constructing the required distribution of extreme values
using resampling techniques, so as to provide a fair test that corrects for the data mining issue.
Essentially it remains a differences-in-mean test, but which diminishes the significance of any
test statistic which suffers from data mining issues. Romano & Wolf (2005) generalizes this
by performing multiple rounds of White (2000)’s Reality Check. If no model is found to be
significant in the first round of testing, then the procedure stops there. However if there are
one or more significant models in the first round of testing, then a second round of testing
is performed using extreme values constructed without using those models. If none of the
remaining models are found to be significant in the second round, then the procedure stops
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there, et cetera. The interested reader is referred to the relevant papers for more details. For
the purpose of this investigation, the test statistics will be:











Where Wk,t denotes the wealth held at time t by following candidate strategy k, and Wb,t
denotes the wealth held by following the benchmark strategy, which is Strategy 1. Here Σfk
is the test statistic, i.e. the difference in the discounted sum of utilities. Since this sum will
actually be taken across a pooled sample of overpricing episodes, it is necessary to reset the
wealth level to W = 1 and the impatience discount to β = 1 at the start of each overpricing
episode, so that Σfk actually consists of the sum of the discounted sum of utilities offered by
the overpricing episodes, as if each is viewed ex ante. The test statistic captures the difference
in ex ante log utility facing an investor if he chooses the alternative strategy rather than the
benchmark. Referring to White (2000), it is important that this test statistic is standardized,
so that if the entire experiment were rerun the resulting value for Σfk would be a draw from
the same distribution as before, i.e. N(Σf∗, ΩT ). The choice of log utility is primarily made
in order to meet this requirement. For a brief discussion of the standardization of Σfk, please
see Appendix 1B, which also explains why no other utility specifications were used. An annual




Datastream time series have on average 261 daily observations per annum.
(ii) the difference in Sharpe ratio between the candidate strategy k and the benchmark.
f¯k = SRk − SRb
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Where the Sharpe ratios (SR) are calculated as in Sullivan et al (1999), and it is left to the
reader to observe that f¯k is standardized. Both of these measures succeed in penalizing a
strategy for bearing additional risk, which is essential, but the utility-based measure (i) is
most successful in this regard since it also penalizes for higher moments such as skewness and
kurtosis, as well as penalizing a strategy the earlier it loses money, reflecting the value investors
assign to holding wealth over time. It is therefore the higher-priority criterion throughout the
study.
To choose parameters (xu, xl, p, y and δ) for the market-timing strategies it is therefore
appropriate to pick values which maximize criteria (i) for the IS overpricing episodes, since
that is the higher priority criterion in the study. For each attempt (an attempt being a
specific strategy with a specific candidate parameter choice, applied to all the overpricings
from the IS), the ensuing stream of returns that arise from the market index returns, dividends,
cash account returns and transaction costs, over the interval [episode-start, market-bottom],
for each overpricing episode sequentially, is used to calculate the statistic. Of course the
arbitrageurs being modelled have no way of knowing when market-bottom occurs, except in
hindsight when episode-end occurs. However they don’t need to be aware of market-bottom
when it happens. All that is necessary is the assumption that they follow trigger strategies
described by Strategies 1-5. It then becomes an arbitrary choice of the researcher as to when
to end the interval, and market-bottom is chosen in order to give Strategy 1 the best chance
of success in the OOS tests. Taking Strategy 3 as an example, each candidate parameter
pair resulted in a Σfk statistic. These were used to perform a grid search in order to find the
candidate parameter pair that maximized Σfk IS. Using this method, the thresholds xu = 1.05
and xl = 0.75 were chosen. This process was repeated for Strategies 4 and 5, resulting in
parameters p = 2.5, y = 1.5 and δ = 220. Note that for any given strategy the same
parameters apply to every country in the sample.
The completed strategies, with their now-constant parameters chosen using the IS, were
then applied to the OOS, whereby each strategy resulted in a single test statistic for Σfk and
a single test statistic for f¯k. In order to execute Romano and Wolf (2005)’s Stepwise Multiple
Testing, it was then necessary to block resample the pooled OOS returns resulting from the
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strategies, so as to form quantiles of the distribution of extreme events. Please see Appendix
1C for a detailed discussion of the resampling methodology, and the Studentization of the test
statistics.
As a robustness check, V1 was repeated in a version which allows short positions, so that if and
when the arbitrageurs sell out of the market they switch the portfolio weight of the index to -1,
and allocate a portfolio weight of 1 to the cash account. Note that short-selling does not raise
any funds for the arbitrageur since the proceeds must be placed as collateral with the broker.
It was also assumed that the broker does not mark-to-market the short position until the final
period. So even though the price of the index may continue to rise before market-bottom,
the study does not assume that the arbitrageur will face collateral calls from the broker until
market-bottom occurs, when the profit or loss is booked all in one go. This is to give Strategy
1 the best chance of success. Even if the arbitrageur shorts the index right at the start of
the overpricing episode, the collateral calls will not cause them to go bankrupt. Only when
market-bottom occurs does the arbitrageur have to cover any short positions, by which time
the market is likely to have dropped in value. This is a tremendous advantage for Strategy
1 as the volatility of its returns is drastically limited over the interval [episode-start, market-
bottom). Although this is unrealistic, it was done deliberately since Strategy 1 represents the
null hypothesis, and we should be quite demanding of any disproof thereof.
V. Results
Please see Table 1 for OOS performance metrics and sample moments for the trading strategies.
Strategy 3 has the highest mean return coupled with moderate standard deviation, skew and
kurtosis. Strategy 4 has the highest Sharpe ratio, but also has high skewness and the highest
kurtosis. Tables 2 and 3 give the test statistics and p-values for V1. Each Studentized test
statistic is followed by its associated p-value in brackets underneath. Note that because the
Reality Check p-values are corrected for data mining, it is not unusual for a positive test statistic
to have a p-value > 0.5. This result indicates that the candidate strategy does outperform the
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benchmark, albeit not in a statistically significant way given the correction for data mining.
An asterisk next to the p-value indicates that it was obtained in the first step of the Stepwise
Multiple Test, and two asterisks indicates that the p-value was obtained in the second step, et
cetera. The best p-value score for each strategy is recorded. Note that the chosen significance
level is 10%, meaning that if none of the remaining test statistics are significant at the 10%
level in any given round, the stepwise testing is terminated there.
Table 1: Trading Strategy Performance Metrics for V1.
For each strategy the OOS returns achieved were pooled across all overpricing episodes, and these obser-
vations were used to calculate standard moments and performance metrics. Note that for Strategy 2 the
case with shorts is equivalent to the case without shorts, since the index is never sold in the buy and hold
strategy.
Mean St. dev Sharpe ratio Skewness Kurtosis
Strategy 1 no shorts 1.257e-4 1.531e-4 -0.056 -13.924 228.269
shorts 5.168e-4 0.010 0.037 24.681 672.200
Strategy 2 no shorts -7.236e-4 0.019 -0.045 -0.054 12.513
Strategy 3 no shorts 2.248e-4 0.006 0.015 -0.201 47.807
shorts 6.829e-4 0.013 0.043 16.920 405.078
Strategy 4 no shorts 1.939e-4 0.003 0.022 -3.655 264.657
shorts 6.224e-4 0.011 0.046 20.829 513.941
Strategy 5 no shorts 1.126e-4 0.012 -0.002 -1.071 25.033
shorts 5.180e-4 0.016 0.024 6.346 131.160
Strategy 3 offers significantly higher Σfk statistics than Strategy 1, both for the cases with
and without short positions. Strategy 3 also offers significantly higher f¯k statistics for the
case without shorts, although the significance of the relationship disappears for the case that
includes short positions. Table 3 reveals that Strategy 4 performs marginally better against
the benchmark than Strategy 3, and therefore according to the f¯k criterion one should choose
the filter rule. However not only is the log utility-based statistic the higher priority criterion, as
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Table 2: Stepwise Multiple Hypothesis Tests for V1 Using Log Utility.
For each strategy one test statistic Σfk is calculated, and the statistics were Studentized as explained in
Appendix 1C. Romano & Wolf (2005) Stepwise Multiple Testing was then used to assess the significance
of the Studentized statistics. Note that in this context an asterisk does not indicate significance. An
asterisk next to the p-value indicates that it was obtained in the first round of testing, and two asterisks
indicates the p-value was obtained in the second round, et cetera. The best p-value score for each strategy
is recorded. T 1/3 and T 1/4 indicate the mean block size used for the resampling.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5
0.1480 1.8246 0.5749 0.5638
T 1/3 (0.5045**) (0.0560*) (0.3230**) (0.3270**)
no shorts 0.1491 1.8651 0.5896 0.5499
T 1/4 (0.5370**) (0.0580*) (0.3465**) (0.3610**)
0.3164 1.8756 0.5569 0.8008
T 1/3 (0.5400**) (0.0915*) (0.4275**) (0.3290**)
shorts 0.3254 1.9396 0.5894 0.8019
T 1/4 (0.5555**) (0.0795*) (0.4480**) (0.3540**)
stated above, but furthermore Strategy 3 offers statistically significant outperformance against
the benchmark for a greater range of cases, i.e. Σfk with and without shorts as well as f¯k
without shorts.
Referring to Table 3, the test statistic for Strategy 3 with short sales allowed is actually
inferior to that of Strategy 5 with no shorts allowed. This may be surprising, since Table 1
indicates that the Sharpe ratio for Strategy 3 is considerably higher than that for Strategy 5.
The difference arises because the benchmark, Strategy 1, performs considerably better in the
case with short sales compared to the case with no short sales. Note that Strategy 3 with
short sales performs considerably better than Strategy 5 with short sales.
Overall the results suggest that market-timing is the optimal course of action since at
least one market-timing strategy, Strategy 3, unequivocally dominates Strategy 1. Although
Strategy 4 and Strategy 5 only offer insignificant performance vs. Strategy 1, it remains the
case that one strategy, which may be assumed to model the choices that some subset of
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Table 3: Stepwise Multiple Hypothesis Tests for V1 Using Sharpe Ratios.
For each strategy one test statistic f¯k is calculated, and the statistics were Studentized as explained in
Appendix 1C. Romano & Wolf (2005) Stepwise Multiple Testing was then used to assess the significance
of the Studentized statistics. Note that in this context an asterisk does not indicate significance. An
asterisk next to the p-value indicates that it was obtained in the first round of testing, and two asterisks
indicates the p-value was obtained in the second round, et cetera. The best p-value score for each strategy
is recorded. T 1/3 and T 1/4 indicate the mean block size used for the resampling.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5
0.1445 1.5686 1.5701 1.1954
T 1/3 (0.5095**) (0.0790*) (0.0785*) (0.1350**)
no shorts 0.1850 1.8836 1.9369 1.5001
T 1/4 (0.4240**) (0.0315*) (0.0260*) (0.0815*)
-3.6843 0.5228 1.1427 -0.9555
T 1/3 (1.0000*) (0.5970*) (0.2745*) (0.9955*)
shorts -3.7049 0.5129 1.1706 -0.9174
T 1/4 (1.0000*) (0.5975*) (0.2495*) (0.9975*)
arbitrageurs make, does strictly dominate Strategy 1. Please see the section below for an
examination of the robustness of this result to variation in the parameters of the overpricing
identification system. As a further robustness check the entire study was repeated twice,
once using a different method for overpricing identification, and once using a slightly different
dataset. These alternate versions are denoted Version 2 and Version 3 respectively. They are
also discussed below in section VI.
VI. Robustness Checks
As mentioned in section IV when describing the overpricing identification method, although
the four parameters used do result in episodes where the market return is predictably negative,
the choice of parameters nonetheless remains somewhat arbitrary. In order to explore the
robustness of the main result to changes in these parameters, Version 1 was repeated a number
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of times with incremental variations to the parameters so as to map out the boundary at which
the main result ceases to hold. The trading strategy parameters (xu, xl, p, y, δ) were held
constant throughout this exercise, so that the only variation in the setup came from the four
overpricing identification parameters. No new IS optimizations were run. The procedure held
three of the overpricing identification parameters constant with the same values used as in
section IV, while the fourth parameter was incremented (and later decremented) repeatedly
until Strategy 3 ceased to be significant at the 10% level for the log utility measure in any of
the four cases: with or without shorts, and for block sizes of T 1/3 or T 1/4. Only the log utility
measure was used because as explained in section IV that is the higher priority criterion in this
study. The procedure was then repeated but with a different parameter under variation, and
holding the other three constant. This continued until each parameter had been individually
subject to variation. In this sense the main result of the study remains robust for the following
parameter ranges:
• The time between overpricing-end and episode-end: 225 to 300 trading days.
• The threshold for the quantile of CAPE: 95% to 99% 6.
• The growth control, i.e. the maximum number of countries that can cross the threshold
into episode-start status at one time: 1 to 2.
With regards to the fourth parameter, the cut-off date between IS and OOS, the picture is
more complicated. Holding the other three parameters fixed, shifting the cut-off date by a
year or so in either direction results in the loss of the statistical significance of the result. To
consider why this might be note that increasing the cut-off date decreases the size of the OOS,
which diminishes the asymptotic limiting behaviour of the test statistic making the test less
reliable. On the other hand, decreasing the cut-off date reduces the amount of information
we have for calculating non-parametric quantiles for the CAPE ratios. So moving the cut-
off date in either direction has drawbacks that diminish either the technique used for testing
significance or the technique used for identifying overpricing episodes. In fact, the reason that
6And in fact for values much lower than 95% as well, although decreasing the parameter too far below
95% may start to yield samples of overpricing episodes which do not match the required definition.
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the original cut-off date of 31st December 1999 was chosen was so as to obtain an optimum
compromise there. However remember that the main result of the study is robust to variation
in the other three parameters over quite a wide range, and in fact it happens that there is a
combination of parameters which retains the main result whilst also being robust to variations
in the cut-off date. If we choose 261 trading days between overpricing-end and episode-end,
95% as the threshold for the quantile of CAPE, and 1 for the growth control, then the main
result is robust to cut-off dates at least over the range 31st December 1999 to 18th October
2001.
Version 2:
Version 2 (V2) uses an overpricing identification method that is identical to Version 1 (V1)
except in two key respects. Firstly, with the aim of including all 47 countries in the test sample
the cut-off point between the in-sample (IS) and out-of-sample (OOS) is defined on a country-
by-country basis as the point at which half of that country’s CAPE ratio time series has passed.
An obvious advantage of this is a larger sample, but a downside is that some of the IS overlap
some of the OOS which regrettably diminishes the integrity of the tests in V2. The problem
is that the arbitrageurs have access to the entire IS when parameterizing Strategies 3-5, so
consequently when they approach the OOS they are effectively using information from the
future of some markets (e.g. Brazil) to trade in the present for other markets (e.g. UK), albeit
in an indirect way. However given that the future information comes from different markets,
it might be suggested that this is not a critical issue, and at the least that the drawbacks are
partly offset by the benefits of the increased sample size.
Secondly, to identify overpricing episodes a similar method will be followed as in V1 but
without any cross-sectional ranking. Here episode-start corresponds simply to the first point
in time when a country’s CAPE ratio reaches its 95% quantile, following either the beginning
of the study or the previous episode-end. Similar rules then follow regarding overpricing-end,
i.e. it is the point at which a country’s quantile of CAPE ratio ceases to exceed 95% and stays
below 95% for 12 months, and episode-end, i.e. it is the point at which a country’s quantile
of CAPE ratio has remained below 95% for 12 months. As one might suspect however this
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method for identifying overpricings is not perfect because it also picks up plenty of growth
episodes, where the nominal market value of the index continues to grow indefinitely in response
to earnings growth. In fact only 40/43 of the IS episodes and 13/20 of the OOS episodes have
nominal market values that are lower at market-bottom than at episode-start.
To correct for the growth issue all the overpricing episodes where nominal market values
are not lower at market-bottom than at episode-start are removed ex post. The interpretation
is that in reality arbitrageurs would have access to a range of real time information that they
could use to discriminate between overpricing episodes and growth episodes ex ante. Much of
this information is not available or feasible to process when backtesting, where we are restricted
to mechanical rules. The removal of the growth episodes in hindsight is designed to replicate
the ex ante discriminatory power the arbitrageurs have in practice. It is important to note then
that for at least two reasons (overlapping IS and OOS, and the need to correct for growth ex
post), V2 is not entirely satisfactory. Hence the results obtained with this method are used
just as a secondary verification of the results from V1. V2 is a robustness check with caveats.
Using this system 40 episodes were identified IS and 13 OOS. Note that Strategy 3 works
in a slightly different way for V2 compared to V1. Here the threshold for an overpricing episode
is fixed at the 95% quantile, so the upper and lower thresholds for selling out, xu and xl, can
instead be absolute quantile levels for the CAPE ratio. Following similar IS parameterization
methods as used in V1, xu = 0.956 and xl = 0.86 are chosen, meaning that once episode-
start passes arbitrageurs following Strategy 3 will sell out if the quantile of CAPE ratio for that
country exceeds 0.956 or falls below 0.86. For Strategies 4 and 5 parameters p = 3, y = 1 and
δ = 40 were chosen. The same method was used for OOS tests as in V1. Please see tables 4
and 5 for the results.
In all cases Strategy 3 delivers consistently higher log utility than Strategy 1. Furthermore for
the case without short positions, Strategy 3 offers positive statistics for the Sharpe ratio-based
test as well. However once data mining is accounted for using White’s Reality Check, none of
the results are statistically significant. The results of V2 are far weaker and far less conclusive
than the results of V1. To consider why this might be, note that the overpricing identification
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Table 4: Stepwise Multiple Hypothesis Tests for V2 Using Log Utility.
For each strategy one test statistic Σfk is calculated, and the statistics were Studentized as explained in
Appendix 1C. Romano & Wolf (2005) Stepwise Multiple Testing was then used to assess the significance
of the Studentized statistics. Note that in this context an asterisk does not indicate significance. An
asterisk next to the p-value indicates that it was obtained in the first round of testing, and two asterisks
indicates the p-value was obtained in the second round, et cetera. The best p-value score for each strategy
is recorded. T 1/3 and T 1/4 indicate the mean block size used for the resampling.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5
0.5818 0.2217 -2.2176 -1.7948
T 1/3 (0.6765*) (0.8290*) (1.0000*) (1.0000*)
no shorts 0.6106 0.2675 -2.0385 -1.6781
T 1/4 (0.6310*) (0.7870*) (1.0000*) (0.9995*)
0.7456 0.2173 -2.0863 -1.6689
T 1/3 (0.4135*) (0.6970*) (0.9990*) (0.9970*)
shorts 0.7964 0.2441 -1.9475 -1.5737
T 1/4 (0.3640*) (0.6680*) (0.9985*) (0.9970*)
technique used to select the sample in V2 was in three ways less satisfactory and less realistic
than that used in V1. As well as only working ex post and having overlapping IS and OOS,
furthermore it generates a sample for which buying and holding the index appears to perform
better than selling or market-timing, as indicated by the size and positivity of the test statistic
for Strategy 2 - although this is not statistically significant either. This suggests that not
only is the overpricing identification method used in V2 unrealistic, but it also does not work
particularly well and perhaps fails to fully correct for the growth issue. It seems reasonable to
assume that selling out of an overpricing, or timing the market, should dominate holding on to
the asset while it falls back to fundamental levels. Hence, it would appear that the technique
used in V2 does not identify overpricings particularly well, and accordingly less weight should
be assigned to the results.
This difference between the results of V1 and V2 suggest that the results of the study are
sensitive to the use of the cross-sectional ranking technique, and/or to the number of countries
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Table 5: Stepwise Multiple Hypothesis Tests for V2 Using Sharpe Ratios.
For each strategy one test statistic f¯k is calculated, and the statistics were Studentized as explained in
Appendix 1C. Romano & Wolf (2005) Stepwise Multiple Testing was then used to assess the significance
of the Studentized statistics. Note that in this context an asterisk does not indicate significance. An
asterisk next to the p-value indicates that it was obtained in the first round of testing, and two asterisks
indicates the p-value was obtained in the second round, et cetera. The best p-value score for each strategy
is recorded. T 1/3 and T 1/4 indicate the mean block size used for the resampling.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5
-0.3276 0.2461 0.2134 0.0803
T 1/3 (0.7430*) (0.5075*) (0.5225*) (0.5845*)
no shorts -0.4279 0.3231 0.2802 0.1049
T 1/4 (0.7840*) (0.4980*) (0.5165*) (0.5905*)
-3.9376 -0.8495 -1.9091 -2.3739
T 1/3 (1.0000*) (0.9985*) (1.0000*) (1.0000*)
shorts -4.1335 -0.9553 -1.7094 -2.1738
T 1/4 (1.0000*) (1.0000*) (1.0000*) (1.0000*)
included in the sample. As discussed above, the overpricing identification technique used in
V1 is in three ways more satisfactory than V2, and if the cross-sectional ranking technique
is necessary to successfully identify overpricings then it will consequently affect the result.
However there also remains the possibility that the results are dependent on the method and
sample.”
Version 3:
In their model AB assume that the asset in question pays no dividends, assuming for example
that the earnings on the stock are reinvested so as to give the holder capital gains as a return.
This results in a simplified payoff function for their model. However Versions 1 and 2 of this
study look at real stock indices which pay out earnings as dividends. In order to improve the
mapping between the empirical work and the theoretical model, Version 3 repeats the study
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but using the Total Return Index (TRI) as the price. New CAPE ratios were calculated, new
quantiles estimated, and new overpricing episodes were identified, all using the same techniques
as used in Version 1. The same four overpricing identification parameters were used as well.
Using this system 16 overpricings were identified IS and 9 OOS, where 14/16 and 8/9
have nominal market values that are lower at market-bottom compared to episode-start. The
trading strategy parameters chosen for V3 are as follows: xu = 1.05, xl = 0.75, p = 2.5,
y = 1.5 and δ = 220. Please see Tables 6 and 7 for the OOS results.
Table 6: Stepwise Multiple Hypothesis Tests for V3 Using Log Utility.
For each strategy one test statistic Σfk is calculated, and the statistics were Studentized as explained in
Appendix 1C. Romano & Wolf (2005) Stepwise Multiple Testing was then used to assess the significance
of the Studentized statistics. Note that in this context an asterisk does not indicate significance. An
asterisk next to the p-value indicates that it was obtained in the first round of testing, and two asterisks
indicates the p-value was obtained in the second round, et cetera. The best p-value score for each strategy
is recorded. T 1/3 and T 1/4 indicate the mean block size used for the resampling.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5
-0.8839 0.4671 -1.3121 -1.1021
T 1/3 (0.9830*) (0.6280*) (0.9965*) (0.9930*)
no shorts -0.8889 0.4671 -1.2702 -1.0236
T 1/4 (0.9860*) (0.6165*) (0.9970*) (0.9900*)
-0.7103 0.4803 -1.1827 -1.0593
T 1/3 (0.9410*) (0.4975*) (0.9830*) (0.9790*)
shorts -0.7297 0.4752 -1.1619 -0.9950
T 1/4 (0.9460*) (0.4995*) (0.9830*) (0.9700*)
The results are similar to V2. Strategy 3 delivers consistently higher log utility than Strategy
1 in all cases. Furthermore for the case without short positions, Strategy 3 offers positive
statistics for the Sharpe ratio test. However once data mining is accounted for using White’s
Reality Check, none of the results are statistically significant. Of course a crucial flaw with
V3 is that market participants do not really regard the TRI as the price. Hence they do not
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Table 7: Stepwise Multiple Hypothesis Tests for V3 Using Sharpe Ratios.
For each strategy one test statistic f¯k is calculated, and the statistics were Studentized as explained in
Appendix 1C. Romano & Wolf (2005) Stepwise Multiple Testing was then used to assess the significance
of the Studentized statistics. Note that in this context an asterisk does not indicate significance. An
asterisk next to the p-value indicates that it was obtained in the first round of testing, and two asterisks
indicates the p-value was obtained in the second round, et cetera. The best p-value score for each strategy
is recorded. T 1/3 and T 1/4 indicate the mean block size used for the resampling.
Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5
-0.0031 1.1596 0.8162 0.9498
T 1/3 (0.6525*) (0.1755*) (0.2935*) (0.2510*)
no shorts -0.0038 1.4438 0.9997 1.1893
T 1/4 (0.6945*) (0.1215*) (0.2550*) (0.1900*)
-4.1596 -0.9200 -1.2794 -2.2645
T 1/3 (1.0000*) (0.9985*) (0.9995*) (1.0000*)
shorts -4.1716 -0.9197 -1.2267 -2.0656
T 1/4 (1.0000*) (0.9975*) (0.9995*) (1.0000*)
respond to TRI or TRI-earnings information in the same way as they would respond to price or
price-earnings information. As a consequence V3 is artificial in a way which could be deemed
important to the theoretical mechanisms underlying the study, and accordingly less weight
should be assigned to the results. V3 is much like V2, merely a secondary verification of the
main result from V1. V3 is a robustness check with strong caveats. However V3 might become
more useful later on in the study.
V1 offers strong evidence that market-timing is the optimal course of action, since the strategy
that immediately sells out of the overpricings is unequivocally dominated by the most successful
market-timing strategy. As explained above, V1 is the strongest and most realistic version of
the study and it should take priority in guiding our conclusions. However it remains the
case that the positivity of the test statistics for Strategy 3 in V2 and V3 serves to further
corroborate the conclusion. Given this evidence for the existence of synchronization risk, what
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follows is empirical support for the modification of AB (2003) to include a parameter controlling
preferences towards synchronization risk.
VII. Synchronization Risk Parameter
As discussed in Section I it is more appropriate to use AB (2003) rather than AB (2002) as
the model for the empirical work in this study. I proceed first by quickly recapping the relevant
parts of the theoretical model from AB (2003). The rational arbitrageurs are assumed to be
long in the market until the time at which they sell out, denoted t. They obtain the following
utility from selling out of the overpricing at time t. It is just the expected payoff:
∫ t
ti
e−rs(1− β(s− T ∗−1(s)))p(s)pi(s|ti)ds+ e−rtp(t)(1−Π(t|ti))− c
List of definitions:
• ti = the time at which arbitrageur i became aware of the existence of the overpricing.
In this sequential awareness model, this time uniquely identifies the arbitrageurs.
• β(s− T ∗−1(s)) is the overpricing component in the asset price at time s. Following the
correction, only the fraction (1− β(s− T ∗−1(s))) of the asset value remains.
• p(s) is the asset price at time s, for the overpricing trajectory. So the post-correction
asset price at time s is given by (1− β(s− T ∗−1(s)))p(s)
• pi(s|ti) is the PDF that arbitrageur i assigns to the overpricing collapsing at time s.
• Π(t|ti) is the CDF that arbitrageur i assigns to the overpricing collapsing at some point
prior to t.
• r and c represent the discount rate and transaction costs respectively.
The optimal choice is derived by maximizing the expected payoff with respect to t. This is
done by differentiating the payoff function with respect to t and equating to zero, which results
in the sell-out condition denoted Lemma 7 in AB:
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If arbitrageur ti’s ”subjective hazard rate” (the left-hand side of the inequality below) is smaller
than the ”cost-benefit ratio” (the right-hand side of the inequality below), then trader ti will





Note that g is defined as the asset price growth rate during the overpricing phase. Conversely,
if arbitrageur ti’s ”subjective hazard rate” is larger than the ”cost-benefit ratio”, then trader





The above summarizes AB (2003) as it currently stands. Note that the agent’s decision on
whether to go long or short on the overpricing is dependent only on the objective parameters
on the right-hand side (g, r and β), and the subjective probabilities on the left-hand side.
No risk preferences come into play in the decision. The agent has no preferences regarding
synchronization risk. The aim of this part of the study is to advance on this, to support the
modification of AB (2003) to include a parameter controlling preferences towards synchroniza-
tion risk.
Let’s start by conjecturing a new parameter, θ, which controls preferences towards synchro-
nization risk. It is better to do this than simply inserting a well-known utility function (e.g.
CRRA) into the payoff function, because the parameter in a concave utiliy function would
capture many things besides preferences towards synchronization risk, and the aim here is to
identify these preferences in as clean and clear a way as possible. Furthermore referring to AB
(2003), if a concave utility function were used the payoff function would cease to be a linear
function of the quantity of stock held. In this case Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 would cease to
hold, and the model would lose the property whereby an agent is 100% ”in” the market until
the exact point when the cost-benefit ratio is exceeded by the subjective hazard rate, at which
stage the agent is 100% ”out” and stays ”out” thereafter. The model would then require a
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recursive payoff function, drastically increasing the complexity of the model and reducing the
clarity, but without a corresponding increase in insight. Specifying a new utility function for
the agent using this parameter (previously this was just the expected payoff):
∫ t
ti
e−rsθ(1− β(s− T ∗−1(s)))p(s)pi(s|ti)ds+ e−rtp(t)(1−Π(t|ti))− c
Intuitively θ is analogous to the impatience parameter used in the consumption-based deriva-
tion of the discrete-time asset pricing model. The more impatient the agent is, the smaller the
impatience parameter is, because the agent weights downwards the utility of second-period
consumption since it is less important to him. Here, the less averse the agent is to synchro-
nization risk the smaller θ is, because the agent weights upwards the payoffs from states where
he sells out prior to the overpricing collapsing.
Differentiating the new expected payoff function with respect to t results in a modified version




[1− θ(1− β(t− T ∗−1(t)))]




[1− θ(1− β(t− T ∗−1(t)))]
conversely implies that the agent chooses to hold the maximum short position. Note that the
smaller θ is, the more likely it is that the left-hand side will dominate the right-hand side,
and the agent will choose to hold the maximum short position. This is consistent with an
elevated preference for synchronization risk. The aim of what follows is to estimate values
for the θ parameter for the different strategies, so as to verify whether the parameter varies
in a meaningful way given the behaviour of the arbitrageurs. All the strategies described in
Section IV work by indicating, at each point in time, whether to go long on the market or
short on the market. So each strategy generates a time series of recommendations on whether
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to go long or short in the market. These recommendations can be reinterpreted via Lemma
7b. Each strategy, for each overpricing, gives a sequence of inequalities based on Lemma 7b.
Provided that the strategy at some point switches from the recommendation of a long position
to the recommendation of a short position, the sequence of inequalities will provide an upper
and lower bound estimate for θ, for that strategy, and for that overpricing episode. We can
denote these upper and lower bounds θu and θl respectively. Referring to AB (2003), βt can
be expressed as a function of g, r and time. A similar formula was used here, although given
the discrete nature of the data a discrete analogue was applied to this task:
βt = 1− (1 + r)
t
(1 + g)t
Hence obtaining numerical values for the upper and lower bounds on θ only requires estimates
of g, r and pi(t|ti)/(1−Π(t|ti)) for each market, where the last quantity is just the subjective
hazard rate, which can be denoted h. To estimate these quantities for each market that
experiences an overpricing in the full-sample (the full-sample of overpricing episodes is used to
aid the convergence of the estimator), a Markov-Switching model is applied to a discrete-time
version of the asset price growth model from AB:
Pt − Pt−1
Pt−1
= µst + σstt
Where Pt is the asset price at time t, µs is the drift parameter for state st, σs is the volatility
parameter and t is a white noise process. The relevant states underlying the model are normal
(N), overpricing (OP) and correction (C) as follows:
• st = N iff t ∈ (market-bottom, episode-start)
• st = OP iff t ∈ (episode-start, market-peak)





Importantly note that in hindsight the state can be known with certainty, by cross-referencing
the market’s nominal value and CAPE ratio time series with the definitions for episode-start,
market-peak, market-bottom, et cetera, given in section IV. Hence estimates for the parameters
of the model can be made conditioning on the fact that in hindsight the state at any time is
known with certainty. This is a trivial case of the Markov-Switching model, but which usefully
provides a well-known procedure for estimating the required quantities r, g and h:
• ri = sample-mean of observed returns that occur during the normal regime for market
i.
• gi = sample-mean of observed returns that occur during the overpricing regime for
market i.
• hi = number of times the transition is made from state OP to state C, as a fraction of
the total number of periods spent in state OP, for market i.
Note that the gi parameters estimated are consistently higher than the ri parameters for the
cross-section of overpricing episodes, and this confirms that the overpricing episodes identified
do offer a higher price growth rate as specified in AB (2003). Applying this procedure to the
full-sample of overpricing episodes (30 episodes for V1, 53 for V2 and 25 for V3) generates
a (θl, θu) pair for each strategy, for each episode. What we are interested in here is whether
the parameter significantly differs in a meaningful way for the different strategies. Specifically
what we want to know is whether θ values for Strategy 1 are significantly lower than those for
Strategies 3-5. This would justify a modified version of AB (2003) which includes a parameter
controlling preferences towards synchronization risk. As well as deepening our understanding
of the mechanics of limited arbitrage, this will also identify the theoretical channel via which
policy-makers could influence arbitrageurs to inhibit mispricings.
To do this a t-stat was derived to assess whether the θl values for each of the candidate
market-timing strategies are statistically greater than the θu from Strategy 1, corresponding
to an increased level of synchronization risk aversion from all the market-timers. Since we are
not just looking at the best-performing strategy, we are not focussing on the extreme values
of the distribution, and consequently no data mining correction is required and a simple t-test
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is appropriate. The derivation of the statistic is in Appendix 1D. Please see Table 8 for the
results of these hypothesis tests for V1, V2 and V3. Each line gives the t-stat and one-tailed
p-value on the test for whether the indicated market-timing strategy’s θl is larger than the θu
implied by Strategy 1, across the full-sample of mispricing episodes. Note that since we are
only interested in the sell-out time, and not the returns or wealth generated by the trades, it
is irrelevant whether or not short positions are allowed.
Table 8: Differences-in-Mean T-tests for the Synchronization Risk Preference Parameter.
For each strategy and each overpricing episode a parameter pair (θl, θu) is estimated from the data. The
t-statistic and one-sided p-values indicate to what extent the θl values for the candidate market-timing
strategies are statistically greater than the θu values from Strategy 1, which sells out of the overpricing
immediately following detection. Higher values of θ correspond to lower appetite for synchronization risk.
Please see Appendix 1D for the derivation of the t-statistic.
Version Strategy t-stat p-value
S3 1.1099 0.1360
V1 S4 2.8030 0.0035
S5 3.3342 0.0008
S3 1.2206 0.1127
V2 S4 4.3003 1.95e-5
S5 3.7548 1.44e-4
S3 1.0921 0.1403
V3 S4 3.3105 8.93e-4
S5 1.1169 0.1350
The t-stats would suggest that the market-timing strategies indeed display a higher aversion
to synchronization risk than the overpricing-attacking strategy (Strategy 1). This is logical
since by their nature they will remain in the market for longer than Strategy 1. Remember
that Strategy 3 also unequivocally dominates the naive overpricing-attacking strategy. The
dominant strategy therefore involves less appetite for synchronization risk, manifesting in a
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higher θ parameter. It is disappointing to note that the p-value here is only on the threshold
of significance at the 10% level. This might have occurred due to the strictness of the test,
which compares θu vs. θl. Nonetheless, at 0.1360, 0.1127 and 0.1403 for V1, V2 and V3
respectively, the p-values for Strategy 3 are convincingly low.
VIII. Conclusion
The efficient market hypothesis suggests that arbitrageurs prevent mispricings by taking correc-
tive positions when they are identified. In this study I provide evidence that when an overpricing
is identified the optimal course of action may not be to take a corrective position, but instead
to remain long in the market so as to profit from some of the growth, before a carefully
timed exit from the market. This evidence goes some way to corroborate AB (2002, 2003)’s
model, wherein synchronization risk induces arbitrageurs to delay taking corrective positions
immediately. In this chapter I suggest that preferences towards synchronization risk can be
captured by the newly proposed parameter, θ, which advances on AB (2002, 2003) to identify
the channel via which policy-makers could influence arbitrageurs to choose synchronization
risk, thus encouraging the endogenous collapse of mispricings.
If policy-makers could diminish the θ of arbitrageurs, then whenever faced with the oppor-
tunity to engage in a market-timing activity it would be more likely that investors would refrain
from doing so. Instead they would be more likely to take their chances with the synchroniza-
tion risk entailed in taking a corrective position against the mispricing. This in itself would
reduce the level of synchronization risk, and since all the agents would be aware of this, a new
self-reinforcing equilibrium would arise where agents sell out of the mispricing early, bringing
the endogenous collapse time closer to the present. In this way, some mild regulation could
incentivise arbitrageurs to suppress mispricings in a market that remains a free price system.
Further research could explore remuneration structures that optimally incentivise managers so
as to overcome the principal-agent problem, while at the same time minimizing the negative
externality of sustained mispricings.
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It is an assumption of AB (2002, 2003) that a sufficient mass of trades by arbitrageurs can
cause the endogenous collapse of a mispricing. However it remains moot whether there is a
causal link between hedge fund holdings and price changes. For example Brunnermeier & Nagel
(2004)’s sample of hedge funds7 held only 0.3% of outstanding aggregate equity. However
as documented by Fung and Hsieh (1997), hedge funds employ dynamic trading strategies,
which suggests that at any given moment a disproportionate fraction of the overall volume of
trades will come from them. Thus despite their low holdings as a proportion of total market
capitalization, their trading actions may nonetheless potentially be a significant causal factor
in the determination of equilibrium prices. It would be ideal if future research could attempt to
establish conclusively what causal link, if any, exists between hedge fund holdings and prices.
7Whose aggregate stock holdings captured about one fifth of the total assets under management in the
hedge fund industry at the time.
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Appendix 1A: Backcasting of Interest Rates
According to the overpricing identification method used in Version 2, Belgium’s stock mar-
ket entered one overpricing episode on 3rd July 1987 and another on 25th May 1989, and
furthermore Denmark entered an overpricing episode on 18th November 1983. Unfortunately
data on Belgium’s one month interbank rate only becomes available on 1st October 1989, and
Denmark’s one month interbank rate only becomes available on 1st July 1988. However data
on the yield on 5-year Belgian government bonds 8, and Denmark’s central bank’s discount
rate, is available going back beyond the 1980s. These rates, which themselves would not be
suitable as a proxy for the local risk-free rate, were used to backcast low risk lending rates
using a simple one factor regression model of the following form:
yt = µ+ βΨt + t
Where:
yt = Denmark or Belgium’s one month interbank rate, respectively.
Ψt = Denmark central bank’s discount rate, or the yield on 5-year Belgian government bonds,
respectively.
The parameters of these two models were estimated using the overlap between the yt and Ψt
observations, and thus where required the missing one month interbank rates were substituted
using yˆt predictions.
8As an exception, this data item was taken from the Global Insight database.
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Appendix 1B: Standardization of Σfk
White (2000, pg 1101) states that his method requires a standardized test statistic with a
continuous limiting distribution. These criteria are met by the Sharpe ratio statistic f¯k, see for
example Sullivan et al (1999). However it is less obvious when it comes to the statistic based








This is the quantity which, appropriately standardized, needs to have a continuous limiting
distribution. Since returns are approximately normal, wealth is lognormal, utility of wealth will
just be a monotonic transformation of a lognormal random variable, and hence sums thereof
may take any value within a subset of the real line, thus meeting the requirements for a
continuous limiting distribution. For the statistic to be standardized, we must believe that
successive repeats of the entire experiment will yield values for Σfk that come from the same
distribution, i.e. N(Σf∗,Ω). Unfortunately the analytical distribution of sums of lognormal
random variables is not currently known. Although approximation methods are available, see
for example Wu et al (2005), it is desirable to avoid making approximations where possible. One
elegant solution is to choose a log utility function, which has the effect of converting Σfk into
the sum of two sequences of normal random variables, provided of course with the assumption
that returns are normally distributed. Let’s assume an initial wealth level of Wk,0 = 1. This
would be the stream of wealth accruing for Strategy k:
Wk,0 +Wk,1 +Wk,2 +Wk,3 = 1 + e
r1 + er1+r2 + er1+r2+r3
In practice discrete compounding is used to calculate the streams of wealth in this study,
so as to match the frequency of the data. Since continuous compounding is equivalent to
discrete compounding when the rate is chosen correctly, it remains valid to use continuous




3logWk,3 + .... = βr1 +β
2(r1 +r2)+β
3(r1 +r2 +r3)+ ....
If the reader is willing to assume that returns are i.i.d. then in a straightforward way the
distribution for Σfk will be the same for every repeat of the experiment. Of course it is
conventional to acknowledge that returns follow a covariance stationary process. Provided
with this, and a long enough time dimension for the sample, the same means and variances
will tend to appear during each repeat of the experiment, and get summed together so that the
distributional parameters of Σfk converge to approximately the same values on each repeat of
the experiment. One complication is that returns which appear early on during an overpricing
episode will get weighted upwards by time, as they appear in every following wealth observation
and receive less of an impatience discount. Hence the larger the number of episodes used in
the test, the more reasonable it is to assume that Σfk will be standardized, since there will
be a greater number of corresponding ”early” values coming from other episodes, which will
receive similar time and impatience discount weightings. In this case, the early values from
the first overpricing episode will not have a disproportionate effect on the distribution of Σfk
for the experiment, but will be offset and averaged-out by the other episodes, leading to a
distribution for Σfk that is approximately the same on each repeat of the experiment - in other
words, Σfk will be standardized.
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Appendix 1C: Resampling
When it comes to resampling a stationary time series, there is a well-defined procedure due
to Politis and Romano (1994a, b) which samples blocks of observations thus capturing the
dependence of the time series data. One uses blocks of random length, distributed according
to the geometric distribution with mean length b. The choices for b are explained later in
this section. The number of resamples to use for each test was set at N = 2000. The
resampled returns were then used to calculate time series of utility of wealth values to arrive
at Σfj,k, and Sharpe ratio values to arrive at f¯j,k, for j = 1, ...., N . In the former case there
is a necessary extra step to the implementation compared to White (2000): the wealth and
impatience discounts are reset to unity whenever a new overpricing episode begins. For example
if the first overpricing episode in the actual OOS corresponds to 200 return observations for
each strategy, then the 201st resampled vector of returns9 would be classed as applying to the
second period of the second overpricing episode, where wealth has been reset to Wj,1 = 1 for
the first period of the second overpricing episode. In this way the resampled returns are used
to calculate a sum of the discounted sum of utilities offered by the overpricing episodes, as if
viewed ex ante.
As suggested by Romano and Wolf (2005) the test statistics were then Studentized, so as
to obtain a higher powered test for several reasonable definitions of power. There are additional
subtle improvements that accrue from Studentization, and the interested reader is referred to
Romano and Wolf’s paper for more details. Studentization requires an estimate of the standard
error of the test statistics, i.e. se(Σfk) and se(f¯k). The most feasible option simply takes the





values obtained from the resampling, thus
arriving at values of se(Σfk) and se(f¯k) for each model k. This methodology for estimating
the dispersion of the test statistics appeals to the same rationale as that underpinning the
construction of the extreme value quantiles in White’s test, and importantly it uses the same
assumptions. Therefore it is most parsimonious to use these estimates to Studentize the test
statistics, both for the actual data and the resamples. This is in preference to alternatives
involving delta methods and HAC covariance matrix estimation, all of which entail additional
9One return observation for each strategy, each corresponding to the same point in time.
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assumptions and approximations that it is more elegant to avoid.





4 respectively, where T represents the time dimension of the pooled time
series of return observations from all overpricing episodes. The first choice minimizes the MSE
of the bootstrapped estimate of the standard error, i.e. se(Σfk) or se(f¯k). The second choice
minimizes the MSE of the estimate of the one-sided distribution we are constructing using the
max values from each resample. Refer to Hall et al equations (2.3) and (2.5) respectively,
to understand clearly what is being minimized with these choices. Ideally we would minimize
both quantities, but since this is not possible the next best alternative is to do one version
where one is minimized, and another version where the other is minimized.
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Appendix 1D: Derivation of the t-statistic
Denote the theta from one strategy as Yi, and the theta from another strategy as Zi, where
both arise from an unknown random distribution and i indexes according to overpricing episode:
Yi → D(µ, σ2Y ); Zi → D(µ, σ2Z)
Each strategy is applied to the same full-sample of overpricing episodes, so the number of
observations in the two samples is the same: N . We want to compare the sample mean of
{Yi}Ni=1 to the sample mean of {Zi}Ni=1, but without assuming that they necessarily follow
the same distribution. It is necessary to allow for covariant observations since the strategies
are being applied to the same full-sample of overpricing episodes. The null hypothesis for the
statistical test is that both random variables have the same population mean. Subtracting Zi
from Yi, we know from the basic properties of expectations and variances:
Yi − Zi → D(0, σ2Y + σ2Z − 2σY,Z)
The sequence {Yi−Zi}Ni=1 is assumed i.i.d., and summed to obtain an approximately Normal
distribution via the Central Limit Theorem:
N∑
i=1
(Yi − Zi) L→ N(0, Nσ2Y +Nσ2Z − 2NσY,Z)
√






L→ St(0, 1, 2N − 2)
Since each strategy is applied to the same full-sample of overpricing episodes, we are running a
more controlled and hence more powerful comparison test than if each strategy was applied to
a different sample of episodes. The covariance term therefore tends to diminish the standard
error, resulting in a larger t-statistic.
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Chapter 3
Distress Risk in the Size and Value Factors
Stock loadings on the Fama-French portfolios are linked to distress risk at the firm-level.
Although factor model betas are estimated with error, I use the SIMEX method to correct
for this measurement error issue and conclusively link betas to distress risk. Furthermore I
use support vector machines to examine the relationship in a nonlinear setting, and find the
surprising result that high magnitudes of beta are linked to distress risk. These findings have
implications for the interpretation of the size and value factors, and their relationship to distress
risk and economic fundamentals.
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I. Introduction
The Fama and French (1996, henceforth FF) 3-factor model prices portfolios sorted on char-
acteristics, solving many of the anomalies with the CAPM. If stocks are priced rationally,
systematic differences in average returns are due to differences in risk. The alphas that sorted
portfolios have on the CAPM are due to accumulated risk premiums that do not come from
exposure to the market portfolio. Since the inclusion of HML and SMB eliminates these al-
phas, these portfolios must proxy for exposure to aggregate risk factors of hedging concern
to investors. This must be true, as otherwise they would not receive a systematic premium.
Given their importance in asset pricing, there has been much debate over what aggregate risks
the HML and SMB portfolios proxy for. Petkova (2006), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Vas-
salou (2003) and Liew and Vassalou (2000) relate HML and SMB to news about the future
state of the economy and innovations to the investment opportunity set. But there is also a
link between firm size, book-to-market equity and bankruptcy risk. Fama and French (1995)
originally suggested that the persistently low profitability of high book-to-market and low size
firms could be due to ’distress’. Dichev (1998) finds that bankruptcy risk is negatively related
to firm size and positively related to book-to-market equity, and in doing so stimulated much
research into distress risk. See for example Campbell et al (2008), Griffin and Lemmon (2002),
Vassalou and Xing (2004), Chava and Purnanandam (2010) and Kapadia (2011). Given the
controversy in the debate on distress risk, and the importance of the HML and SMB portfolios
to asset pricing theory, this chapter seeks to investigate the link between exposure to the HML
and SMB portfolios and bankruptcy risk.
Petkova (2006) finds that innovations in the investment opportunity set are significantly
correlated to HML and SMB, and that an ICAPM model that contains as factors the market
return, and innovations to the aggregate dividend yield, term spread, default spread and 1-
month T-bill yield, explains the cross-section of average returns on 25 portfolios sorted by firm
size and book-to-market equity almost as well as the FF model. The market portfolio proxies
for wealth, and it also proxies for a fraction of the changes to the investment opportunity
set, but not enough to fully price portfolios of stocks sorted on characteristics. Stocks with
extreme characteristics are relatively sensitive to changes in the investment opportunity set,
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and require factors which strongly capture innovations thereof in order to be priced. Vassalou
(2003) finds that news related to future GDP growth is an important factor for explaining
the 25 portfolios. A model including this factor via a mimicking portfolio can explain returns
about as well as the FF model. When the GDP news-related factor is included in the asset
pricing model, SMB and HML lose most of their ability to explain returns, suggesting that
much of the information in HML and SMB is news related to future GDP growth. Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001) demonstrate that by allowing the parameters of the function relating the
stochastic discount factor to the chosen factors to vary as a function of a conditioning variable
reflecting investor expectations, cay, the CAPM, human capital CAPM, and consumption
CAPM all achieve dramatically improved performance in terms of R-squared and significance
of coefficients, when pricing the 25 portfolios. The most success is observed with the human
capital CAPM and the consumption CAPM, where the R-squareds are comparably large to that
achieved with the FF 3-factor model. Liew and Vassalou (2000) show that returns on HML
and SMB are positively related to future growth in the real economy, and the predictive power
of these portfolios is not diminished by the market portfolio when that is included. Inclusion of
other business cycle variables does not eliminate the forecasting ability of HML and SMB either.
The literature would seem to demonstrate that the HML and SMB factors are barometers of
investor expectations regarding the future state of the economy and the investment opportunity
set, and that covariates which proxy for this are what is required to price the 25 portfolios.
Assuming rational expectations and efficient markets, this would suggest that value stocks and
small stocks fundamentally perform relatively well when the economy is good, and relatively
badly when the economy is bad.
But let us not forget the link between firm size, book-to-market equity and bankruptcy risk.
Fama and French (1995) find that high book-to-market stocks have sustained low profitability
for approximately five years before and after portfolio formation, while low book-to-market
stocks have sustained high profitability. High book-to-market stocks have sustained high book-
to-market ratios for approximately five years before and after portfolio formation, with the
same pattern for low book-to-market. The evidence would appear to suggest that value stocks
are discounted due to lower profitability, which gradually improves, leading to a reduction
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in book-to-market ratio and their eventual departure from the value portfolio. Fama and
French describe the persistent low profitability of the high book-to-market portfolio of firms
as ’distress’. Dichev (1998) finds that bankruptcy risk (proxied by Z-score and O-score) is
negatively related to firm size and positively related to book-to-market. Campbell et al (2008)
use the fitted probability of failure from their logit model as a measure of financial distress,
and create portfolios of stocks sorted by this probability to find that financially distressed firms
have high market betas and high loadings on the HML and SMB factors.
Putting all the evidence together, we should therefore expect high betas on HML and/or
SMB to be related to distress risk, as these will tend to be the small size and high value stocks
that are most likely to be distressed and are fundamentally sensitive to the future state of the
economy. This is a prediction that I investigate empirically in this paper.
I use a longitudinal dataset of firm-month observations to estimate a logit model for the
probability of default, similar to Campbell et al (2008) and Shumway (2001). To avoid the
use of noisy default risk proxies, I use actual incidences of default as the dependent variable.
This requires that the analysis is restricted to the firm-level. I estimate Carhart (1997) 4-factor
betas for every firm-month using 250-day windows of daily data, and use these as explanatory
variables in the logistic regression. Since OLS coefficients are being used as regressors, naive
logit coefficients are subject to bias analogous to the bias encountered in a 2-stage least
squares regression. The SIMEX method is applied to correct for this measurement error
bias. The results demonstrate that loadings on HML and SMB are significantly related to
incidence of default. Surprisingly the sign of the coefficient on the HML beta is negative.
To investigate further, nonlinear support vector machines (SVM) are applied to the same
classification problem. One of the advantages of SVM is that the underlying equation need
not be linear, as is the case for a logit specification, and moreover the SVM itself learns the
optimal shape to use to separate the classes. These results clearly show that a high magnitude
for a firm’s HML or SMB beta implies a higher probability of default. Stock returns are
sensitive to the news proxied by the HML and SMB portfolios, either positively or negatively,
when their fundamental financial performance is poor and they are at risk of bankruptcy.
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Avramov et al (2013) explore the relationship between financial distress and asset pricing
anomalies. In particular they examine financial distress as proxied by rating downgrades,
because this has ex ante implications for a firm’s future performance. They find that the
profitability of many trades exploiting anomalies is mostly due to the short side of the strategy
among the lowest-rated firms. The value effect is only significant amongst the low-rated
stocks, and corresponds to long positions that survive financial distress and go on to generate
relatively high returns. As part of their study, they demonstrate that portfolios containing
stocks with the highest (i.e. best) tercile of credit ratings have lower betas on MKT, SMB and
HML, and that betas increase as the tercile of credit ratings worsens. This goes some way to
addressing the prediction motivated earlier in this introduction. However although Avramov et
al (2013, Table 1) demonstrate that βHML is hump-shaped in credit risk, the paper does not
go further regarding this nonlinearity since its focus is on the profitability of trading strategies
based on asset price anomalies. In contrast this study takes a closer look at the relationship
between βSMB, βHML and the ex ante probability of default as motivated by the prediction
outlined earlier in this introduction, and furthermore elaborates on the nonlinear nature of that
relationship.
Campbell et al (2008) estimate a default risk proxy using a logit specification, and sort
stocks into portfolios according to that proxy before running 3-factor regressions on the portfo-
lios. In Table VI and Figure 3 of that paper they demonstrate that βHML and to a lesser extent
βMKT are hump-shaped in distress risk. Garlappi and Yan (2011) provide theoretical and em-
pirical reasons to believe there is a nonlinear relationship between default probability and beta.
They construct an equity valuation model involving financial leverage, wherein shareholders
might be incentivized to default on their debt in order to recover part of the residual firm value
following the resolution of financial distress. They then go on to use the distance-to-default
measure as a proxy for a firm’s distress risk, and group stocks into portfolios according to that
proxy to empirically examine how βMKT varies in distress risk. Similar to Campbell et al (2008)
they find that beta is hump shaped as distress risk rises. In this study I estimate a logit that
relates factor exposures to bankruptcy observations at the firm-level, exploiting the SIMEX
method to overcome the measurement error issue. Similar to Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and
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Campbell et al (2008) I use a logit specification with ex post bankruptcy observations as the
left-hand side variable. As in those studies, the model predicted probabilities of default that
result serve as a proxy for distress risk. I therefore examine the relationship between sensitivity
to SMB and HML, and ex ante distress risk. The question that matters is whether distressed
stocks are fundamentally sensitive to the future state of the economy. I then proceed to use
support vector machines (SVM) with the aim of empirically verifying the relationship between
Fama-French 3-factor loadings and distress risk, as measured by the estimated ex ante proba-
bility of default, while accounting for nonlinearity. As a result I demonstrate that stock returns
are sensitive to aggregate macroeconomic risks when their fundamental financial performance
is poor, and that this sensitivity can be either positive or negative.
II. The Basic Model
The study uses a limited dependent variable setting to regress a binary variable with values
1 for observed default and 0 otherwise, on lagged explanatory variables. Using the Carhart
(1997) model, let’s denote the factor mimicking portfolios RMKT , RSMB, RHML and RWML,
corresponding to market, size, value and momentum factors. The factor loadings on RMKT ,







each stock i, and are obtained from the following time-series regression:
Rit−Rft = αi+βiMKT (RMKTt −Rft )+βiSMB RSMBt +βiHMLRHMLt +βiWMLRWMLt +it (1)
Where Rit is the return on stock i, and R
f
t is the risk-free rate. The first step of the procedure
calculates OLS estimates of these factor loadings for firm i at time t using a rolling window
of the past 12 months of daily data. The aim of these rolling windows is to capture dynamic
variation in a stock’s exposure to the factors as the firm’s level of distress changes. This is





















are then used as the explanatory variables in the
linear relationship underlying the following logit model:
Y i,t+τ = 1{−ui,t<a+b βi,tMKT+c βi,tSMB+d βi,tHML+e βi,tWML} (2)
For i = 1, ...N and t = 1, ...T . Y i,t+τ is a binary variable taking value 1 if the firm defaults
within the τ months following time point t, and 0 otherwise, where τ is the lag chosen. In
practice a range of lags from 1 month to 48 months could be used, but most studies, e.g.
Campbell et al (2008) and Chava and Jarrow (2004), focus on using a 1-month ahead predictor
for failure risk, and the same is done here. Since a lag of 1 month is chosen, it is natural
for each t to also correspond to 1 month. Note that we are in a panel data setting, which











, i.e. T × N firm-months, to estimate one
parameter set (a, b, c, d, e). Where indicated in the results, Shumway (2001)’s market and
accounting variables are used as controls for the logistic regression.
III. Data
The bankruptcy indicator was taken from Sudheer Chava’s bankruptcy database10, which spans
from 1962 to July 2008. It includes all bankruptcy filings in the Wall Street Journal Index, the
SDC database, SEC filings, and the CCH Capital Changes Reporter. The stock market data
was taken from CRSP, and covers all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms listed from 1961 till
July 2008. Accounting variables were sourced from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database.
The 4-factor returns time series RMKT , RSMB, RHML and RWML were taken from Kenneth
French’s online data library, as was the risk-free rate Rf .
It is interesting to use a number of different versions of the stock sample. Firstly, Garlappi
and Yan (2011) note that low price shares are often those in the greatest distress, and filtering
10Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Chava et al (2011).
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them out can decisively alter results (see Table I and Figure 3 from their paper). However on
the other hand Chava and Purnanandam (2010) suggest that shares with market price < $1
suffer from market microstructure issues, such as bid-ask bounce and forced delisting, and
consequently filter them out. Therefore I run one version of the experiment including low price
shares, and another version excluding them. Secondly, Shumway’s model requires accounting
data, but if you are only using the 4-factor betas and the total volatility as your explanatory
variables then you do not require accounting data and can therefore include stocks without a
COMPUSTAT match. Since using COMPUSTAT engenders a well-known survivorship bias11,
it is also interesting to see what happens with a dataset that does not require COMPUSTAT
matches. Hence define four different versions of the full-sample:
• D1: CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firm-months with COMPUSTAT data and a market
price ≥ $1.
• D2: CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firm-months with COMPUSTAT data and a market
price observation.
• D3: CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firm-months with a market price ≥ $1.
• D4: CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firm-months with a market price observation.
Note that D1, D2, D3 and D4 have 505, 1093, 613 and 1253 defaults in their full-samples
respectively, so another benefit from relaxing the requirements that each firm-month has a
market price > $1 and a COMPUSTAT match is to vastly increase the number of bankrupt-
cies in the full-sample. Please see Table 9 for descriptive statistics of the bankruptcy data.
Consistent with the distress risk literature, each explanatory variable is winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles of the distribution observed across all firm-months. This step is taken
due to the presence of large outliers in accounting data. Please see Table 10 for descriptive
statistics summarizing the winsorized explanatory variables. NITA is the annual net income
of a firm scaled by its total assets, TLTA is the total liabilities of a firm scaled by its total
assets, EXRET is the return on a stock in excess of the return on a value-weighted CRSP
11Albeit arguably only a minor bias e.g. see Chan et al (1995).
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Bankruptcy Dataset.
The bankruptcy data was taken from Chava and Jarrow (2004), and the interested reader is referred to
that paper for additional summary statistics and analysis of the observed defaults. However note that
here I use an updated version of the database that includes recent observations up to and including 2008.
Firm-months with a refresh rate of less than 8.33% are excluded from these statistics. Please see the
discussion of stale data later in this section for more details.
# firms in sample 25569
# firms with no bankruptcy 24308
# bankrupt firms 1261
# bankrupt firms with price observation 1253
# bankrupt firms with p < $1 640
# firms with COMPUSTAT match 20974
# bankrupt firms with COMPUSTAT match 1093
# bankrupt with COMPUSTAT match & price observation 1093
# bankrupt with COMPUSTAT match & p < $1 588
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index, over the last month, and RSIZE is the relative size, calcu-
lated as the log of the ratio of the firm’s market capitalization to the total market capitalization
of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks on CRSP at that time. SIGMA(R) is defined as the
standard deviation of the last 60 market returns of the stock, calculated following the use of
interpolation to handle missing price data. SIGMA(e) is the standard deviation of the resid-
uals from regression equation [1]. Similarly βMKT , βSMB, βHML and βWML are the betas
from that regression. At this stage it is useful to define three important regressor combinations
that appear at various times throughout this study:
• E1: βMKT , βSMB, βHML, βWML, NITA, TLTA, EXRET , RSIZE and SIGMA(e).
• E2: βMKT , βSMB, βHML, βWML and SIGMA(R).
• E3: NITA, TLTA, EXRET , RSIZE and SIGMA(e).
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E1 includes the 4-factor betas and Shumway’s variables as controls, and may be considered
the full model. Since no two explanatory variables have a correlation greater than 0.5 in
magnitude, it is safe to conclude that multicollinearity is not an issue. E2 does not include the
controls and uses SIGMA(R) instead of SIGMA(e). The advantage of this stripped-down
model is that it does not require accounting data. E3 is just Shumway (2001)’s market and
accounting variables model.
It is worth briefly discussing the issue of stale data. In Campbell et al (2008), SIGMA
observations are calculated using a window of 3 months of daily return observations. They
code an observation as missing if fewer than one twelfth of return observations are nonzero. In
this study I follow suit. If a firm-month’s 250-day OLS window contains fewer than one twelfth
nonzero daily return observations, then I exclude that firm-month from the study. Please see
Figure 10 for a histogram that illustrates the refresh rates for the firm-months in the unfiltered
full-sample, i.e. D4. The median refresh rate is 81%, and 2.81% of firm-months have a refresh
rate of lower than 8.33%, corresponding to one twelfth. However in this study not only are we
estimating stock volatilities, but we are also estimating 4-factor betas, and it is the latter that
are more critical to the hypothesis tests. Even if we filter out firm-months with a refresh rate
of lower than 8.33%, non-synchronous trading engenders the risk of understating betas, as in
Epps (1979). Section VII looks at this issue more thoroughly.
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for the Explanatory Variables.
Each explanatory variable is first winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution observed
across all firm-months. This step is taken due to the presence of large outliers in accounting data, and is
consistent with the distress risk literature. SIGMA(e) and SIGMA(R) have been expressed at a monthly
scale.
Median Mean Min Max St. dev
NITA 0.0068 -0.0084 -0.4142 0.1053 0.0704
TLTA 0.5349 0.5366 0.0311 1.2949 0.2663
RSIZE -10.9834 -10.8784 -15.2740 -5.9172 2.0041
EXRET -0.0084 -0.0020 -0.4004 0.5563 0.1407
SIGMA(e) 0.1110 0.1380 0.0001 0.5427 0.0984
SIGMA(R) 0.1135 0.1428 0 0.6107 0.1083
βMKT 0.7992 0.8245 -0.7951 2.7185 0.6607
βSMB 0.5736 0.6865 -1.2654 3.3515 0.8354
βHML 0.1874 0.2018 -2.7205 3.0496 0.9280
βWML -0.0330 -0.0691 -2.4346 2.0237 0.6985
IV. Methodology
The methodology used in this study follows some of the key papers in the distress risk literature
including Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Campbell et al (2008). In particular
the statistical method behind the logit models follows Shumway (2001), wherein a panel data
logit estimation using T ×N firm-months is shown to be equivalent to a discrete-time hazard
rate model, as required. A firm is included in the study from the first time at which all necessary
market and accounting information are available, until either it experiences bankruptcy or is
censored. Censoring occurs when market prices are no longer observed for the firm, e.g. because
the firm has been acquired. If a company has multiple bankruptcy filings I consider only the
first instance, and then remove them from the sample. Similar to Chava and Jarrow (2004),
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missing observations of market or accounting data are handled by substituting the previous
available observation. So for D1 and D2, if a particular firm-month is missing COMPUSTAT
accounting data but that data was observed for that firm at a previous point in time, the
firm-month is included. In the event that a stock is missing a lot of market price data, note
that the worst-affected firm-months are excluded from the study altogether as a result of the
rule on refresh rates discussed in section III. Consistent with the distress risk literature, each
explanatory variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution observed
across all firm-months. This is done separately for the in-samples, out-of-samples and full-
samples. All explanatory data is lagged in the sense that when at time t we are forecasting
bankruptcy over the interval (t, t + 1], only the most recent explanatory data available at or
before time t is used. Finally, since the factor loadings are estimated using OLS, standard
theory indicates that they will suffer from estimation error. Referring to Carroll et al (2006)










are then used as the explanatory
variables for a logistic regression. Both the logit coefficients and their standard errors will
be attenuated due to the bias. To mitigate this issue, one year’s worth of daily returns is
used in the OLS regressions run using equation [1], so as to achieve as much convergence
in the estimators as possible, while keeping the betas relevant as a predictor of default over
the coming month. In this way it is hoped that the naive logit regressions will retain some
validity, and I include the results below in section V since the method is widely known and
easily understood. Nonetheless, a full correction for the measurement error issue is made in
section VI using the SIMEX method.
V. Logit Results
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Table 11: Naive Logit Regressions for Default.
A logit regression is used to relate the panel data of default indicators to the winsorized explanatory vari-
ables. This was done using different versions of the sample, denoted D1, D2, D3 and D4, and for different
regressor combinations as indicated. Absolute values of the t-stats are shown underneath in parentheses.
ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic. This measures the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy
of the model, and a score of 1 corresponds to perfect prediction capability, while a score of 0.5 suggests the
model is no better than randomly guessing. Please see the text for more details. R2 denotes McFadden’s
pseudo-R2.
D1 D1 D2 D2 D3 D4
Intercept -14.14 -10.52 -14.78 -9.86 -10.68 -10.00











SIGMA(R) 2.64 2.28 2.85 2.44
(30.92) (52.62) (35.56) (57.76)
βMKT 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.16 0.05
(3.56) (2.17) (4.37) (1.08) (2.61) (1.28)
βSMB -0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.04
(0.38) (1.04) (2.15) (1.19) (0.46) (1.45)
βHML -0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00
(0.16) (1.43) (2.04) (0.64) (0.82) (0.10)
βWML -0.21 -0.25 -0.18 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20
(4.36) (5.31) (6.50) (7.56) (4.90) (7.55)
ROC 0.78 0.79 0.88 0.89 0.81 0.90
R2 0.17 0.10 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.15
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Table 11 reports the logit coefficients along with absolute values of their t-stats in parentheses
underneath. The R2 reported is McFadden’s pseudo-R2, calculated as 1− L1L0 , where L1 is the
log likelihood of the estimated model and L0 is the log likelihood of a null model that includes
only a constant term. All of these statistics were estimated using the full-sample of data. The
ROC is the Receiver Operating Characteristic. To calculate this, first the full-sample is split
into an in-sample (IS) and an out-of-sample (OOS), where the cut-off point between them has
been chosen as January 2000. The model is then trained using the IS to estimate coefficients.
This IS model is used to estimate a probability of default over the forthcoming 1-month period
for each firm-month in the OOS. Each firm-month is then ranked from highest probability of
default to lowest, and the sum of the actual defaults is taken so as to obtain the cumulative %
of actual defaults as a function of the probability of default (highest to lowest). The ROC is
the integral of the cumulative % of actual defaults as a function of the probability of default.
Therefore an ROC of 1 corresponds to perfect OOS prediction capability, while 0.5 would
suggest that the model is no better than randomly guessing. This version of the ROC is
sometimes referred to as a Cumulative Accuracy Profile (CAP).
It is notable that when low price shares are included (D2) and the full specification is used
including all control variables (E1), the 4-factors are statistically significant predictors of default
over a 1-month horizon. It might be surprising to see that probability of default is decreasing
in βHML, and I take a closer look at why this might be in section VIII. It would appear that the
inclusion of shares with market price < $1 is decisive to the significance of βSMB and βHML,
at least for the case of a logit specification with a linear underlying equation. Referring to
Table 9, of those 1093 bankruptcies with a COMPUSTAT match, 588 have p < $1 at the time
of bankruptcy. Therefore excluding low price shares removes more than half of the bankruptcy
observations. This reduction in sample size might be the reason for the loss of significance of
βSMB and βHML in D1. However it is also quite possible that the relationship identified is
specific to low price shares. The implication would be that low price shares that are at risk of
bankruptcy have a greater sensitivity to the news proxied by SMB and HML than higher price
shares that are also at risk of bankruptcy. In section VIII I explore whether a nonlinear model
is robust to the exclusion of low price shares.
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Table 12 investigates what happens if we try to predict bankruptcies further into the future.
Using the full specification (E1) and including low price shares (D2) I estimate the probability
of bankruptcy in 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 4 years. Note that similarly to
Campbell et al (2008), at time t I am estimating the probability of bankruptcy occurring over
the interval (t+ j−1, t+ j], conditional on no default occurring over the interval (t, t+ j−1],
where j ∈ [1, 6, 12, 24, 48]. Table 12 confirms that the significance of the coefficients is robust
to longer horizons.
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Table 12: Naive Logit Regressions for Default at Longer Horizons.
A logit regression is used to relate the panel data of default indicators to the winsorized explanatory
variables. This was done using the full-sample that includes low price shares (D2), and the full specification
including all control variables (E1). The model predicts the probability of bankruptcy occurring over the
interval (t + j − 1, t + j], where j is as indicated. Absolute values of the t-stats are shown underneath
in parentheses. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic. This measures the out-of-sample
forecasting accuracy of the model, and a score of 1 corresponds to perfect prediction capability, while a
score of 0.5 suggests the model is no better than randomly guessing. Please see the text for more details.
R2 denotes McFadden’s pseudo-R2.
j (months) 1 6 12 24 48
Intercept -14.78 -13.10 -12.07 -10.70 -9.67
(48.81) (55.48) (55.26) (49.84) (42.31)
NITA -1.88 -2.06 1.33 -0.87 -0.13
(7.90) (9.30) (5.49) (3.01) (0.33)
TLTA 3.28 2.91 2.39 1.72 1.15
(28.15) (29.57) (25.58) (17.80) (10.51)
RSIZE -0.29 -0.24 -0.20 -0.13 -0.08
11.45 (11.79) (10.67) (7.05) (3.80)
EXRET -3.44 -1.52 -1.02 -0.84 -0.20
(18.97) (10.80) (7.37) (5.55) (1.17)
SIGMA(e) 1.08 0.86 0.73 0.57 0.46
(14.29) (12.78) (10.63) (7.43) (4.96)
βMKT 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.28
(4.37) (6.23) (6.44) (6.67) (5.47)
βSMB 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.14
(2.15) (2.63) (5.50) (5.60) (3.77)
βHML -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06
(2.04) (1.67) (1.92) (4.18) (2.11)
βWML -0.18 -0.16 -0.12 -0.07 -0.07
(6.50) (6.10) (4.47) (2.47) (2.02)
ROC 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.72 0.65
R2 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.02
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Although the results of the naive logits are promising, please read on to Sections VI and VIII
for some more conclusive evidence. However it is worth taking the time to briefly mention one
consequence of the naive logit tests. Referring to Table 13, the results show that the 4-factor
model used in conjunction with the total volatility (E2) can be used to achieve marginally
better OOS forecasting accuracy than Shumway’s market and accounting variable model (E3),
with the added advantages that it only requires market variables and is therefore applicable to
a much wider range of stocks, and can produce revised forecasts at a much higher frequency.
In unreported results I show that it is SIGMA(R) and βWML which provide almost all of the
explanatory power in the 4-factor model. It would seem that stocks with negative momentum
and high total volatility are most at risk of default, something which is borne out in results
from Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004).
Table 13: Default Prediction Using the 4-factor Betas and SIGMA(R).
Logit regressions were used to relate the panel data of default indicators to the winsorized explanatory
variables. This was done using a specification matching Shumway (2001)’s market and accounting variable
model (E3), and a specification that uses only the 4-factor betas and the total volatility (E2). This was
repeated using a version of the dataset that excludes low price shares (D1), and a version that includes low
price shares (D2). ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic. This measures the out-of-sample
forecasting accuracy of the model, and a score of 1 corresponds to perfect prediction capability, while a
score of 0.5 suggests the model is no better than randomly guessing. Please see the text for more details.
R2 denotes McFadden’s pseudo-R2.
D1E3 D1E2 D2E3 D2E2
ROC 0.7796 0.7927 0.8795 0.8900
R2 0.1705 0.1038 0.2159 0.1457
VI. Simulated Extrapolation
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The naive logit regressions from Section V provide an heuristic insight into the relationship











selves estimated in OLS regressions, they are effectively measured with error. This will lead to
attenuated logit coefficients, and understated standard errors. Please see Carroll et al (2006)
and Wang et al (1998) for more details on measurement error in logistic regression.
Wang et al (1999) explain how regression calibration can be used to correct for the coeffi-
cient attenuation resulting from measurement error bias in logistic regression. This approach
is advantageous since it is not computationally intensive. Unfortunately the asymptotic limits
are obtained for a case where the number of clusters approaches infinity for fixed and finite
subjects, i.e. T >> N . In this study the opposite is true, and the number of subjects far
exceeds the number of clusters, i.e. N >> T . The next best alternative is known as Simulated
Extrapolation (SIMEX). Wang et al (1998) provide a clear explanation of how to apply it to a
longitudinal logistic regression where the number of subjects exceeds the number of clusters,
i.e. N >> T . To briefly outline the procedure, let us denote X the true, unobserved covariate,
and W the related error-prone covariate. In an additive error setting:
Wi,j = Xi,j + Ui,j
The Ui,j are independent of the Xi,j and are independently distributed N(0,Σi,j). We then
proceed by estimating Σi,j , which in this case comes directly from the OLS theory. Note
that the technique can handle heteroskedasticity, as every firm-month (i, j) can have its own
covariance matrix Σi,j . The procedure then calls for us to choose some positive value ξ, and
proceed to remeasure W, B times as follows:




E [Wb,i,j(ξ)|Xi,j ] = Xi,j
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And:
var [Wb,i,j(ξ)|Xi,j ] = (1 + ξ)Σi,j = (1 + ξ)var [Wi,j |Xi,j ]
Formally, the key property of the remeasured data is as follows:
MSE [Wb,i,j(ξ)] = E
[
(Wb,i,j(ξ)− Xi,j)2|Xi,j
]→ 0 as ξ → −1
The logit specification is then estimated B times, using the randomly generated Wb,i,j . This
results in B sets of logit coefficients, and the average is taken of each coefficient to arrive at the
logit coefficient set corresponding to the ξ value chosen: ˆΘ(ξ). This is repeated for a range of ξ
values, so that a function relating the logit coefficient values to ξ can be estimated. Therefore
by extrapolating the ˆΘ(ξ) function back to ξ = −1 we obtain a value of the coefficient for the
hypothetical scenario where there is no measurement error, Θˆsimex. This is the value of ξ for
which (1+ξ)Σi,j = 0 for all i and all j. The SIMEX method naturally extends to estimation of
measurement error-corrected standard errors. For more details the interested reader is referred
to Carroll et al (2006), Chapter 5 and Appendix B.4.
One drawback of the SIMEX method is that it can rapidly become computationally very
intensive. Therefore the B and ξ parameter choices were made so as to compromise between
computational feasibility and the efficacy of the SIMEX method. Setting B = 200 and choosing
six ξ values, (0, 0.4, 0.8, 1.2, 1.6, 2), requires 1001 logit models to be run, i.e. 200 for each
non-zero ξ and one for ξ = 0. Since each dataset version contains approximately three million
firm-months, the procedure also requires the generation of approximately three billion sets of
four correlated random variables. All of this is computationally very intensive, but referring to
Carroll et al (2006) such parameter choices are quite typical. Consequently the procedure is
only applied to the full specification (E1) using the dataset including low price shares (D2).
Furthermore ROC are not reported, due to the computation time that would be involved in
estimating a set of in-sample coefficients. Nonetheless please note that the ROC for the naive
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logit models in Table 11 already validate the predicting model used. Please see Table 14 for
the SIMEX results.
Table 14: SIMEX Logit Regression for Default.
A SIMEX logit regression was used to relate the panel data of default indicators to the winsorized ex-
planatory variables. Due to the computational cost of the SIMEX method, this was done only once, using
the full-sample including low price shares (D2), and the full specification using all control variables (E1).
Absolute values of the t-stats are shown underneath in parentheses. R2 denotes McFadden’s pseudo-R2.
Intercept NITA TLTA RSIZE EXRET SIGMA(e) βMKT βSMB βHML βWML R
2
-15.24 -1.81 3.28 -0.32 -3.35 0.98 0.29 0.10 -0.08 -0.32 0.22
(46.58) (7.56) (28.10) (12.08) (18.51) (12.41) (4.85) (2.38) (2.24) (7.54) 0.22
Comparing Table 14 to Table 11, there are no meaningful differences in the sign, magnitude
or significance of the logit coefficients, and hence the conclusions from Table 11 are robust to
corrections for the measurement error issue.
VII. Non-Synchronous Data
So far all the tests have involved betas that were estimated using daily return observations, the
aim being to mitigate measurement error issues. However this is not without its drawbacks.
The issue is that increasing the sampling frequency for returns leads to a bias towards zero in
covariation statistics. See Epps (1979) for example. For highly traded stocks there is not much
of an issue when using daily data, but the betas of small stocks, with less frequent trading,
can be substantially underestimated when using daily returns. Barndorff-Nielsen et al (2008)
provide a survey of the literature on non-synchronous data issues.
For this reason the experiment was repeated using weekly return observations to estimate
the factor loadings. I used the full specification (E1) and the dataset that includes low price
shares (D2) to estimate a naive logit and a SIMEX-corrected logit. Referring to Table 15, it
would appear that the significance of the logit coefficients does not survive when weekly returns
are used for the beta estimations. This appears to be the case even with the SIMEX correction,
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and raises the possibility that the results from Table 11 could be sensitive to non-synchronous
data as well as low price shares.
However note that a logit model uses a linear underlying equation and will therefore only
successfully separate bankruptcies from non-bankruptcies if there is a monotonically increasing
or decreasing relationship between the probability of bankruptcy and the regressor. In this case
however there is existing evidence that gives us reason to believe that high magnitudes of βHML
might be related to increased probability of bankruptcy. For example Griffin and Lemmon
(2002, Table 1) show that the quintile of stocks with the highest probability of default also
contains the greatest range of book-to-market values. Any linear model is therefore potentially
misspecified. Please read on to Section VIII, where I examine the evidence using a nonlinear
model. Using SVM to apply a nonlinear underlying equation I demonstrate a relationship
between the factor loadings and bankruptcy risk that is robust to non-synchronous data and
the inclusion of low price shares.
Table 15: Logit Regressions for Default Using Weekly Return Observations: Non-
Synchronous Data.
A naive logit regression and a SIMEX logit regression were used to relate the panel data of default in-
dicators to the winsorized explanatory variables. Here, the 4-factor betas and the total volatility were
estimated using weekly rather than daily returns, as a way to control for non-synchronous data. Due to
the computational cost of the SIMEX method, this was done only using the full-sample including low price
shares (D2), and the full specification using all control variables (E1). Absolute values of the t-stats are
shown underneath in parentheses. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic. This measures
the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of the model, and a score of 1 corresponds to perfect prediction
capability, while a score of 0.5 suggests the model is no better than randomly guessing. Please see the text
for more details. R2 denotes McFadden’s pseudo-R2.
Intercept NITA TLTA RSIZE EXRET SIGMA(e) βMKT βSMB βHML βWML ROC R
2
Naive logit -14.86 -1.74 3.29 -0.30 -3.46 1.32 0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.12 0.88 0.22
(52.76) (7.16) (28.04) (13.07) (18.92) (14.42) (1.14) (4.76) (0.95) (6.56)
SIMEX -15.03 -1.70 3.29 -0.32 -3.42 1.20 0.05 0.13 -0.02 -0.22 NA 0.22
(51.11) (6.98) (27.91) (13.19) (18.62) (12.62) (1.24) (5.17) (0.90) (7.72)
VIII. Nonlinear Support Vector Machines
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As mentioned previously Garlappi and Yan (2011) provide theoretical and empirical reasons
to believe there is a nonlinear relationship between default probability and beta. In Table
II of their paper they present empirical results showing CAPM betas are hump shaped as
distress risk increases, and Figure 3 shows empirical evidence that the value spread is non-
monotonic as a function of distress decile. It is unfortunate then that typical binary classifiers
are only able to achieve a linear separation between classes. Although the probability gradient
between class 0 and class 1 is nonlinear due to the cumulative density function used, the
separation in input space is forced to be linear. In other words the underlying equation in [2]
is linear. Obviously among the advantages of using logit and probit models are that they offer
widely understood statistical tests for significance, and estimated coefficients that are easily
interpreted as marginal effects. But when applied to data where there is known theoretical
and empirical evidence of nonlinearity, those benefits may be outweighed by the risk that in
fitting a linear separator to a nonlinearly separated dataset, spurious results may arise.
As a first step in addressing this reasonable concern, I split the full-sample of firm-months
into those where a default occurs over the next month and those where no default occurs
over the next month. Figures 11-16 show histograms that compare the distributions of the
winsorized betas for the default firm-months vs. the non-default firm-months. These graphs
indicate that the kurtosis of the beta distribution is much higher for those firm-months expe-
riencing imminent default. It might be surprising to observe that it is not just high betas that
are linked to default, but extreme magnitudes of betas. This nonlinear relationship was not
apparent from the logit models, and in particular note that large positive βHML are linked to
default, as are large positive βSMB and βMKT . In order to handle this nonlinearity one option
is to apply a nonlinear support vector machine. One of the advantages of SVM is that the
procedure will separate the classes via an algorithm that chooses the shape of the separating
boundary in an entirely data-dependent way. Another alternative would be to include regres-
sors such as β2HML in a logit model as a way to capture the nonlinearity, but the drawback
is that this entails assuming a particular shape for the decision boundary. Since specification
E1 involves nine regressors, we are therefore in 10-dimensional space and it is not possible to
know what the shape of the nonlinear separating surface is. For this reason the SVM method
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was favoured. The trade-off is that while the logit method provides tests for the statistical
significance of coefficients, the SVM does not.
Alpaydin (2010) provides a good introduction to nonlinear support vector machines, while
Suykens et al (2002) provides the necessary detail for what follows in this chapter. A Gaussian
kernel was used. The two relevant parameters for the optimization (cost, C, and sigma, σ)
were chosen using a 3-fold cross-validation applied to the in-sample (IS). More folds would have
been used ideally, but the process is very computationally intensive given the size of the dataset.
Not only are there approximately 2 million vectors in the in-sample, but since the number of
defaults is far lower than the number of non-defaults, upsampling must be used. Upsampling
ensures that the machine achieves roughly the same in-sample error rate for both the minority
and majority class, by resampling the minority class until the proportions are equivalent. It
is a technique commonly used in machine learning to ensure that the majority class does not
overwhelm the optimization process, and to avoid a result with a very high success rate for the
majority class, but a very low success rate for the minority class. An upsampled dataset will
achieve a better ROC statistic than a dataset with a disproportionate minority class. Following
upsampling the in-sample alone contains as many as 3 million observation vectors, and hence
a large-scale algorithm implementing the Nystrom method is required. The interested reader is
referred to Suykens et al (2002) for more details of this technique. In a nutshell, the standard
(small-scale) nonlinear support vector machine (SVM) algorithm optimizes a cost function that
involves a (T×N)×(T×N) matrix of the kernel interactions between each firm-month vector
in the in-sample and every other vector in the in-sample, known as the Gram matrix. If there
are 3 million vectors in the in-sample, the associated Gram matrix has 9 trillion elements, which
ceases to be computationally feasible. The Nystrom method provides a feasible and effective
alternative.
To verify the robustness of an SVM model12, a receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
can be calculated to quantify the OOS prediction accuracy achieved by the model after being
trained on the IS. This statistic is calculated in a similar way as for the logit models before.
A logistic function is applied to the output of the SVM discriminant function so that rather
12The choice of kernel function and explanatory variables, as applied to the dataset in question.
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than the SVM making discrete binary predictions, we instead obtain a predicted probability
of default. This procedure is known as Platt (2000) scaling. Following the OOS accuracy
test, the SVM is finally trained on the full-sample (FS) to exploit all the data. One drawback
with SVM vs. logit models is that it is not possible to describe the predictions of the model
using a table of coefficients. The prediction for any instance of a vector that you may wish to
classify is the result of a nonlinear function of the kernels between the instance you wish to
classify, and a relevant subset of the vectors from the in-sample. Instead, one can graph how
the predicted probability of default varies as we vary one explanatory variable of interest, while
holding the others fixed. The issue of where to hold the other explanatory variables fixed is
important, since the whole point of the exercise is that the decision boundary is nonlinear. I
hold all explanatory variables fixed at their post-winsorized medians, and then vary the target
variable from its post-winsorized minimum to maximum. Please see Figures 17-25 at the end
of this document.
Strong ROC statistics suggest that the SVM models used are robust and have not been
overfitted in-sample. For the full specification (E1) we see that increasing βMKT , βSMB or
βHML is linked to increasing probability of default. This result is robust to whether or not
low price shares are included, and to whether daily or weekly returns are used to estimate
betas. Therefore in this nonlinear setting we have a relationship between factor loadings and
probability of firm default that is robust to the exclusion of low price shares, and is robust
to non-synchronous data issues. One caveat to these results is that each graph is merely a
2D-slice through 10-dimensional space. Any of the relationships depicted in the graphs may
change as the fixed variables are moved away from their medians. Nonetheless holding the
variables fixed at their medians seems reasonable as a way to explore how the variation in the
target variable affects probability of default for typical values of the other variables.
Unfortunately the SVM methodology does not provide tests for the statistical significance
of individual regressors in the same way that logit models do. Instead the procedure relies
on judicious choice of regressors followed by out-of-sample testing. In this case the choice of
regressors was justified using the histograms in Figures 11-16, and the ROC then verifies how
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robust the model is out-of-sample. The economic significance of a regressor is observed by
the change in predicted probability of default given a change in the regressor. Similar to logit
models, the marginal impact on predicted probability of changing a regressor is not constant.
What we do observe is that holding all other regressors fixed at their winsorized medians, and
varying either βSMB or βHML from their respective minimum observed value through to their
maximum, results in predicted probabilities of default that vary over at least a 4% range in
all cases. For example in Figure 17 the predicted probability of default varies from 34.73%
to 38.83%. That is a wide variation in predicted probability of default, given that referring
to Table 9 the unconditional probability of observing a default in the sample of firms with a
COMPUSTAT match is 5.21%. The prediction capability of the models has of course been
verified by ROC statistics.
The results suggests that loadings on the size and value factors are related to default.
However, as might be expected given the controversy in the literature, the picture is more
complicated than this. Robust to all versions we see a concave up parabola for likelihood of
default as a function of βHML and βSMB. So as the βHML or βSMB passes the minimum
level of distress probability (usually at betas of -1 to 1), and becomes increasingly negative, the
likelihood of default also increases. High magnitudes for a firm’s βHML or βSMB are related
to increased probability of default. This might explain why the logit coefficients for βHML and
βSMB are not robust for all versions of the study. Firms that are expected to receive higher
returns than average via the factor loadings are linked to increased probability of default, and
firms that are expected to receive lower returns than average via the factor loadings are also
linked to default.
IX. Conclusions
This chapter examines the relationship between exposure to the HML and SMB portfolios and
probability of default. I regress actual incidences of default on 4-factor betas using Shumway
(2001)’s variables as controls. The results clearly show that high magnitudes for a firm’s βHML
or βSMB are related to probability of default. What may be surprising is that a large negative
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coefficient with HML and SMB also leads to rising default probability. Petkova (2006), Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001), Vassalou (2003) and Liew and Vassalou (2000) find that the SMB and
HML portfolios are sensitive to news about the future state of the economy and innovations to
the investment opportunity set. In this chapter I demonstrate that stock returns are sensitive
to these aggregate macroeconomic risks when their fundamental financial performance is poor,




A long-short portfolio that buys low beta stocks and shorts high beta stocks has been shown
to earn an anomalous premium on standard factor models. This chapter finds that for the
1990-2012 subsample the anomaly disappears when an unconditional 4-factor model is used,
while for both the 1926-2012 full-sample and the 1926-1990 subsample the anomaly survives.
The structural break could be attributable to a rise in leverage, as in Frazzini and Pedersen
(2013). Furthermore, a conditional 4-factor model results in substantially reduced alphas for
the full-sample and the 1990-2012 subsample. Conditional estimates are obtained using daily
data and Lewellen and Nagel (2006)’s short-window regressions.
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I. Introduction
Frazzini and Pedersen (2013, henceforth FP) show that for a sample of US equities 1926-
2012, the risk-adjusted returns on portfolios of stocks sorted according to their CAPM beta is
monotonically decreasing as the portfolio beta increases. Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2010,
2013) show that the geometric mean return on portfolios sorted into quintiles according to
their CAPM betas is monotonically decreasing as the portfolio beta increases. These findings
are at odds with the financial axiom that investors are rewarded with higher returns for bearing
systematic risk.
FP explain their results via a theoretical model that builds on the earlier work of Black
(1972). Both of these papers relax the CAPM’s traditional assumption that investors are free
to borrow without constraint. Black explores a model where there is a riskless asset available,
but in which investors are not allowed to take short positions in the riskless asset. The result
is a security market line (SML) that is shallower in slope than for the traditional CAPM.
FP advance on this to suggest that the majority of investors, such as individuals, pension
funds and mutual funds, are constrained in their borrowing and choose instead to overweight
risky securities to increase returns. The result of this demand for high-beta stocks is that
in equilibrium these stocks require lower risk-adjusted returns than low-beta stocks, as the
latter are only appealing to those investors who can exploit leverage to amplify the returns.
One of the predictions of their model is a flatter SML as in Black (1972). FP then go on
to demonstrate that a market-neutral long-short portfolio going long on low beta stocks and
short on high beta stocks (the ”Betting-Against-Beta” factor) earns a statistically significant
premium on standard factor models. Furthermore they provide evidence consistent with their
leverage explanation.
An alternative explanation is given by Hong and Sraer (2012), who use differences-in-beliefs
to explain the anomaly as the result of speculative overpricing of high beta stocks. When
investors disagree about the common factor in firm cash-flows, high beta stocks experience a
greater divergence of opinion about their payoffs, and short-sales constraints result in the high
beta stocks being overpriced.
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There is a literature that seeks to explain older and more familiar anomalies such as the
value effect using a conditional CAPM. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) demonstrate that if
a conditional CAPM is the true process generating returns, estimating coefficients using an
unconditional regression will result in a biased alpha. The bias arises due to the covariance
between the conditional risk premium and the conditional beta, a phenomenon referred to in
this paper as ”dynamic exposure”. Unfortunately estimating conditional factor models is not
without its difficulties. Ang and Chen (2007) find that a conditional one-factor model can
explain the returns on stocks sorted according to book-to-market over their extended sample
of 1926-2001, implying that it is dynamic exposure to the market premium which accounts for
the unconditional alpha observed on value portfolios. However their study involves specifying
the conditional beta as an endogenous latent process. Petkova and Zhang (2005) find that
a portion of the premium on the HML portfolio is due to dynamic exposure to the market
risk premium, but their study relies on the assumption that instruments such as the aggregate
dividend yield, default spread, term spread and short-term interest rate are sufficient to capture
investors’ information sets. Lewellen and Nagel (2006, henceforth LN) provide a feasible
method for estimating conditional factor models that circumvents these issues, and this is key
to the results of this chapter.
This chapter seeks to address whether a conditional 4-factor model is capable of explaining
the returns on beta-sorted long-short portfolios. I use CRSP data from 1926-2012 to run a
simple version of the Betting-Against-Beta strategy that goes long on low beta stocks and
short on high beta stocks. The returns on these portfolios are regressed on Carhart (1997)’s
4-factor model using standard OLS to obtain unconditional alphas. I then estimate conditional
4-factor alphas using LN’s short-window regressions, and find that the conditional alphas are
substantially smaller than the unconditional alphas. Following this I form subsamples, and
find that for the 1990-2012 subsample the unconditional alphas are statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, for this subsample the conditional alphas of the portfolios are orders of magnitude
smaller that the unconditional alphas.
The evidence is that following 1990 the Betting-Against-Beta premium disappears. The
structural break is coincident with economically significant growth in hedge fund AUM, which
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is strongly suggestive of a rise in the proportion of capital under the control of leverage
unconstrained arbitrageurs as defined by FP. Moreover it is interesting to note that a con-
ditional model results in substantially reduced alphas. This suggests that part of what the
Betting-Against-Beta portfolio offers comes from time-varying exposure to the 4-factors. A
decomposition reveals that time-varying exposure to the market and value factors accounts for
an economically significant portion of the Betting-Against-Beta premium.
Sefton et al (2011) use LN short-window regressions and the 3-factor model to investigate
whether dynamic exposure explains the Betting-Against-Beta effect in the 500 European stocks
with the highest market capitalization over the period 1994-2011. In this chapter I go fur-
ther and use the 4-factor model on all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks in the CRSP database,
spanning 1926-2012. Furthermore, I explain the long-short portfolio alpha using a theoretical
decomposition, and investigate the effect in subsamples 1926-1990 and 1990-2012. I iden-
tify that for the full CRSP cross-section, the effect disappears in the 1990-2012 subsample,
coincident with a rise in leverage in the fund management industry.
II. Data
Market data was taken from CRSP, and covers all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms listed
at any time between July 1926 till December 2012. In the case where any market data are
missing, I substitute the previous available observation where appropriate. Daily returns are
then calculated for each stock, using all available data on dividends, stock splits and delisting
returns. In the event that a stock is delisted and no delisting return is available on CRSP then
a return of −30% is used, following Shumway (1997). The risk-free rate, market, SMB, HML
and WML factor return time series were taken from Kenneth French’s online data library.
Due to the breadth of the cross-section the sample includes a subset of stocks that are illiq-
uid and have price observations that do not vary at the daily frequency. Such non-synchronous
trading engenders the risk of understating betas, as in Epps (1979). However we need daily
frequency observations in order to achieve convergent beta estimates that still remain pertinent
to the risk of the stock at portfolio formation time. One way to correct for this is by excluding
stocks with a price refresh rate of less than 75%. In fact for robustness three versions of
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the study are run. V1 only considers stocks for inclusion in the sorted portfolios if they have
75% or more non-zero daily return observations over the six months leading up to rebalancing
time. V2 and V3 only consider stocks if their market capitalization is above the 49th or 81st
cross-sectional percentiles respectively, at rebalancing time. These thresholds were chosen
because in 2012 the 49th and 81st percentiles of market capitalization ranked NSYE, AMEX
and NASDAQ stocks in CRSP had market capitalizations of approximately $250M and $2bn,
which correspond to the thresholds at which stocks might be classed as small-cap and mid-
cap. Using the percentile as a filtering criterion rather than a nominal dollar value is robust to
inflation over the 1926-2012 sample period.
III. Method
Every month I estimate the CAPM beta for each stock, using the prior 6 months of daily
return observations. I then rank the stocks cross-sectionally according to their CAPM beta,
and choose one portfolio consisting of the upper tercile of stocks (denoted ”H”) and one
portfolio consisting of the lower tercile of stocks (denoted ”L”). Ideally quintiles would have
been used, but during the early years of the sample period there were too few eligible firms to
achieve sufficiently diversified quintile portfolios. Figure 26 shows that the number of eligible
firms rises steadily over the years for V1, but nonetheless on the first portfolio formation date,
16th December 1926, there are only 365 firms that meet the criteria for inclusion in the study.
The tercile sorts result in two different portfolios: H and L for the high beta and low beta
stocks respectively. The equal-weighted and value-weighted daily returns on these portfolios
are calculated for the ensuing month, before the monthly rebalancing occurs again. This is
repeated every month from December 1926 till December 2012. Finally the returns on the H
portfolios are subtracted from the returns on the L portfolios, to obtain two L-H return time
series, one for the value-weighted case and one for the equal-weighted case.
FP suggests we should expect these L-H portfolios to exhibit a premium on the standard
factor models in unconditional regressions. Here I intend to investigate whether this premium
still exists in a conditional setting. Referring to Jagannathan and Wang (1996), if the CAPM
holds conditionally but one estimates the coefficients using an unconditional OLS regression,
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an extra term arises which biases the alpha estimate. This term is due to the covariance
between the beta exposure and the market risk premium. To recap, here is the conditional
CAPM:
E [Ri,t|It−1] = α0t−1 +MKTt−1βMKTi,t−1
α0t−1 is the conditional expected return on a ”zero-beta” portfolio, MKTt−1 is the conditional
market risk premium and βMKTi,t−1 is the conditional beta of asset i. Taking unconditional
expectations of both sides:
E [Ri,t] = α
0 +MKTβ¯MKTi + cov(MKTt−1, β
MKT
i,t−1 ) (3)









It is the third term in equation [3] that potentially causes bias. It arises due to the covariance
between conditional risk premia and the portfolio’s exposure to the conditional risk premia, a
phenomenon referred to in this chapter as ”dynamic exposure”. In Appendix 3A I derive an
analogous result for the 4-factor model. One of the aims of this chapter is to establish whether
the unconditional premium of the L-H beta-sorted portfolio is due to this bias. It is possible
that the L-H portfolio offers no premium on conditional factor models. Given how central the
linear relationship between beta and expected return is to financial theory, this study aims to
determine whether the unconditional alpha achieved by the L-H beta-sorted portfolio on the
4-factor model remains significant in a conditional setting.
Cochrane (2005, page 145) summarizes the difficulty in reaching such an objective: ”Mod-
els such as the CAPM imply a conditional linear factor model with respect to investors’ infor-
mation sets. The best we can hope to do is test implications conditioned on variables that we
observe. Thus, a conditional factor model is not testable!” The issue is severe. Yet LN’s short
window regressions, using daily data and no conditioning variables, give direct estimates of
conditional alphas and betas provided we are willing to believe that betas are relatively stable
within the estimation window. Ang and Chen (2007, pages 10-12) derive the inconsistency
bias and limiting distribution distortion for the unconditional OLS alphas and betas that result
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if the true process generating stock returns follows a conditional CAPM. They specifically cri-
tique the short window regression method, as the bias and distortion terms they derive do not
dissipate with higher sampling frequency, and moreover to correct for the bias and distortion
would require parameters that can only be estimated using the true conditional beta time se-
ries. Since the conditional betas continue to vary within the short windows, the short window
regression method does not capture the true conditional beta time series and it is not possible
to make the correction. In response to this, LN (2006, Appendix B) use simulations to for-
mally explore how high-frequency changes in beta affect their short-window regressions. They
assume that both conditional betas and the conditional market risk premium follow AR(1)
processes, that shocks to the conditional risk premium are allowed to covary negatively with
market returns, and that shocks to conditional betas are allowed to covary negatively with stock
returns. For simulations covering a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values, the
high-frequency changes in beta do not impact substantially on conditional alpha estimation.
In fact the short window regression technique works almost perfectly as long as market returns
are not too highly correlated with shocks to the conditional risk premium. LN (2006)’s short
window regression method is therefore favoured as a tractable route to estimating conditional
factor coefficients.
I proceed by regressing the L-H portfolio time series on Carhart (1997)’s 4-factor model
using unconditional OLS applied to the full-sample of data, from 1926-2012:
RLt −RHt = αu +MKTtβMKT + SMBtβSMB +HMLtβHML +WMLtβWML + t (4)
Following this I apply LN’s short window regression method to estimate conditional 4-factor
model coefficients. For each six-month window a standard OLS regression is run, resulting in
a time series of conditional alphas for the L-H portfolio {αct}Tt=1. As well as running these
regressions for the full-sample of data spanning 1926-2012, I additionally examine subsamples
spanning 1926-1990 and 1990-2012. The choice of 1990 as the partition between subsamples
is motivated by the growth in hedge fund AUM that occurred 1985-1994. Chany et al (2005)
observe that, ”the explosive growth in the hedge fund sector over the past several years has
generated a rich literature both in academic and among practitioners.” Fung and Hsieh (1999,
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Table 1) documents the ”rapid growth in assets managed by an increasing number of hedge
funds and CTA funds in the 1990s.” Table 16 shows TASS data on hedge fund AUM taken
from Fung and Hsieh (1999). AUM is expressed in absolute $ terms, as well as being expressed
as a proportion of US GDP and as a proportion of the combined US$ GDP of the G7 countries.
According to all three metrics hedge fund AUM grew considerably over the period 1985 to
1990, approximately by a factor of ten, and substantial growth in AUM continued throughout
the 1990s. The exact choice of 1990 as the partition for the subsamples does remain somewhat
arbitrary, but Tables 22 and 23 in Appendix 3B demonstrates that the main results of the study
are robust if 1985 or 1994 are used instead.
Table 16: Number and Assets of Hedge Funds.
Hedge fund numbers and AUM are taken from the TASS database. GDP figures are taken from the World
Bank. The aggregated G7 GDP figures were calculated by taking GDP observations for the US, UK,
Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy, converting into US$ using contemporaneous exchange rates,
and then summing.
Year # Hedge Funds AUM (US$ bn) AUM / US GDP AUM / G7 GDP
1985 37 0.4 0.009% 0.005%
1990 231 6.5 0.109% 0.044%
1991 310 10.1 0.164% 0.065%
1992 442 17.9 0.274% 0.107%
1993 644 35.8 0.520% 0.208%
1994 856 41.3 0.565% 0.225%
1995 1027 50.4 0.658% 0.252%
1996 1076 59.4 0.733% 0.298%
1997 987 64.6 0.750% 0.327%
Table 17 presents the regression results. Alphas are shown as annualized percentages. For
each L-H portfolio I take the arithmetic mean of the time series of conditional 4-factor alphas,
and calculate the percentage reduction this offers on the unconditional 4-factor alpha. T -stats
for the alphas are shown in parentheses. Standard tests strongly reject null hypotheses of
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homoskedasticity and zero autocorrelation in the unconditional OLS regression residuals, and
therefore Newey-West HAC standard errors were used to calculate those t-stats. Lag length for
the corrections was chosen optimally using the data, following Andrews and Monahan (1992).
In all cases, the Newey-West standard errors result in smaller t-stats. For the conditional
alphas t-stats are estimated using the sample variability of the conditional alphas as in LN
(2006, Table 3). Note that because these standard errors are calculated using the sample
variability of the conditional alphas, they should be robust to heteroskedasticity 13, and to
autocorrelation 14.
IV. Results
For the full-sample the conditional alphas are lower than the unconditional alphas in an eco-
nomically significant way, but the conditional and unconditional alphas remain statistically
significant. However the subsamples appear to reveal a structural break in the data. While
the L-H beta-sorted portfolio retains its statistically significant premium in the 1926-1990
subsample, this premium disappears in the 1990-2012 subsample. Furthermore for the later
subsample, using a conditional 4-factor model as opposed to an unconditional model results
in alphas that are up to 1004% smaller. For this subsample, dynamic exposure appears to be
a substantial part of the L-H portfolio’s premium.
To test the hypothesis that there is a structural break in the vicinity of the year 1990 a Chow
test is performed. The resulting p-values are given in Table 18. In every case the null hypothesis
of parameter stability is unambiguously rejected, and we may conclude that a structural break
occurs.
The results suggest that dynamic exposure to established sources of risk are a substantial
part of the low risk anomaly in the full-sample and 1990-2012 subsample. The following
13Which does not affect the standard error of a sample average.
14Which shouldn’t exist in conditional alphas if the conditional 4-factor model holds since each alpha





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18: Chow Test for a Structural Break between the 1926-1990 and 1990-2012 Sub-
samples
The sample was split into subsamples spanning 1926-1990 and 1990-2012. For the full-sample and each
of the subsamples the returns on the L-H portfolio were regressed on the 4-factor model. The residual
sum of squares from these regressions were then used to compute the F -statistic for a standard Chow test.
These F -statistics and the associated p-values are given below. vw and ew refer to value-weighting and
equal-weighting for the L and H portfolios respectively.
V1 V2 V3
vw F -stat 970.72 1100.51 1259.90
p-value 0 0 0
ew F -stat 1559.27 2524.14 2264.74
p-value 0 0 0
decomposition reveals which of these risk factors are contributing to the anomaly:


















This decomposition is the analogue of LN (2006, equation 1), or Jagannathan and Wang (1996,
equation 4), but which has been generalized to the 4-factor case. The term on the left-hand
side is the alpha that arises theoretically if unconditional OLS is used to estimate coefficients
when the true process generating returns is the conditional 4-factor model. Equation [5]
decomposes the theoretical unconditional alpha into the linear sum of eight terms, where each
of the 4 factors corresponds to two of those terms. The task is then to empirically estimate the
terms from the right-hand side, so as to reveal how much of the L-H portfolio’s unconditional
alpha is attributable to each of the MKT, SMB, HML and WML factors respectively. Please
see Appendix 3A for the derivation, and a brief discussion on how the terms on the right-hand



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 19 indicates that dynamic exposure to MKT and HML accounts for an economically
significant portion of the unconditional alpha on the L-H portfolios. Dynamic exposure to
WML appears to work in the opposite direction and would lower the unconditional alpha of
the L-H portfolios, however its effect is dominated by MKT and HML. The effect of SMB
depends on the subsample. T is the total unconditional alpha predicted by the decomposition.
Observe how the differences between unconditional alphas and mean conditional alphas in
Table 17 correspond very closely to the unconditional alphas predicted in Table 19. Of course,
the decomposition assumes that the 4-factor model holds conditionally and so will not explain
any unconditional alpha that arises due to anomalies with the conditional 4-factor model.
In unreported results I analyse the statistical significance of each term from equation [5].
Standard errors for the covariances were estimated using the same method as in LN (2006,
Table 6)15. The covariance terms were found to be statistically insignificant except for SMB,
but on the other hand the mean conditional betas, unconditional betas and factor premiums
were universally found to be highly significant.
V. Robustness Checks
When estimating CAPM betas on individual stocks the aim is to measure the systematic risk of
the stock at portfolio formation time. Hence I use short 6-month windows for the regressions
in order to capture conditional betas that are as close as possible to the underlying time-
varying conditional beta process. Given the brevity of the window it is natural to choose daily
frequency return observations to achieve convergent estimators. Unfortunately this leads to
a potential issue, as non-synchronous trading for some stocks may result in beta estimates
that are biased down. For example Epps (1979) investigates how correlations between major
stocks in the same industry diminish as the frequency of return observations increases. Please
15Referring to Appendix 3A we use the following estimator: ˆcov(βMKTi,t ,MKTt) = cov(b
MKT
i,t , RMt). To
obtain standard errors we first calculate σ2 = var(RMt) which is hence treated as a constant. We then
run the following regression: bMKTi,t = γ0 + γ1(RMt/σ
2) + t. Since γ1 = cov(b
MKT
i,t , RMt), OLS gives
us standard errors for the covariance estimator which implicitly condition on the sample variance of the
conditional betas.
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see Barndorff-Nielsen et al (2008) for an up-to-date explanation of the non-synchronous data
issue. I already filter out stocks with low price refresh rates (V1), or market capitalizations
below the 49th or 81st percentiles (V2 and V3 respectively). Nonetheless as an additional
control for non-synchronous data I repeat the experiment but using non-overlapping 3-day
returns to estimate the CAPM betas on individual stocks. This still gives 42 observations
per 6-month window. So it offers a good compromise between achieving convergence for
the beta estimators, capturing conditional betas that are close to the underlying time-varying
conditional betas, and alleviating potential issues with non-synchronous trading. In contrast
weekly returns would only give 26 observations per 6-month window, and would be a poor
alternative. Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) do something similar when estimating betas for
individual securities, except that they use overlapping 3-day returns.
This repeat of the experiment is exactly the same as before, except that 3-day returns are
used when estimating the CAPM betas on individual stocks. To calculate 3-day excess returns
on the market portfolio I use the same method as described in Appendix 3A for calculating
realized 6-month factor returns. Once the CAPM estimations are complete and the L and
H portfolios have been chosen, the non-synchronous data issue effectively disappears. Hence
as before I use the daily returns on the portfolio constituents to calculate daily returns on
L and H, and run all of the 4-factor regressions using daily frequency return observations.
Please see Table 20 for the results, which confirm that the conclusions of the study are robust.
Furthermore note that LN (2006, Table 3) show how the mean conditional CAPM alphas
estimated for SMB, HML and WML portfolios are fairly robust regardless of whether they
use quarterly windows with daily returns, semi-annual windows with daily returns, semi-annual
windows with weekly returns or annual windows with monthly returns. As a final robustness
test, the experiment was rerun using quintile portfolios instead of terciles. Table 21 shows that
the results of the study are also robust in this case.
VI. Conclusions
The low risk anomaly documented by Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) and Baker, Bradley and
Wurgler (2011) is a paradoxical result that runs counter to an axiom of financial theory. In this































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with a rise in hedge fund AUM. Furthermore, a conditional 4-factor model is capable of
explaining an economically significant portion of the returns on the risk-sorted portfolio in the
full-sample and the 1990-2012 subsample. In particular, it is time-varying exposure to the
MKT and HML factors that contributes to the premium. One hypothetical reason for this
structural break is that for the 1990-2012 subsample a smaller proportion of investors were
constrained in their leverage, causing the security market line to steepen as low risk assets
experienced increased demand, and high risk assets were sold short.
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Appendix 3A: Alpha Decomposition
Assume that Carhart (1997)’s 4-factor model holds conditionally:
E [Ri,t|It−1] = α0t−1 +MKTt−1βMKTi,t−1 +SMBt−1βSMBi,t−1 +HMLt−1βHMLi,t−1 +WMLt−1βWMLi,t−1
This is similar to Jagannathan and Wang (1996, equation 2) except that here we are using
the 4-factor case. α0t,t−1 is the conditional expected return on a ”zero-beta” portfolio. Taking
unconditional expectations of both sides we derive an expression for E [Ri,t]:


























From the definition of covariance E [XY ] = cov [XY ] + E [X]E [Y ]. Therefore:





















Where e.g. ¯MKT is the average conditional premium, and ¯βMKTi is the average conditional
beta. Again this is a generalized 4-factor analogue of Jagannathan and Wang (1996, equation
4). Let’s define the following vectors:



















Now we can derive something analogous to LN (2006, equation 1). An asset’s unconditional
alpha is defined as αu = E [Ri,t]− α βui . Therefore substituting for E [Ri,t] yields:

















Note that this is the same as equation [5]. It assumes that the true process generating returns
is the conditional 4-factor model, and decomposes the resulting unconditional OLS alpha into
eight terms, two for each of the 4-factors: (i) the difference between mean conditional beta and
unconditional beta, scaled by the mean risk premium for that factor, and (ii) the covariance
between the conditional premium and the portfolio’s conditional beta on that factor. Both
of these quantities capture how dynamic exposure to any given factor contributes to the
unconditional OLS alpha. This is intuitively obvious for the covariance terms, but also note
that LN (2006, equations 1 and 2) show that the difference between the mean conditional
beta and unconditional beta is related to dynamic exposure. The covariance terms can be
estimated using LN (2006, equation 10):
cov(bMKTi,t , RMt) = cov(β
MKT
i,t , RMt) = cov(β
MKT
i,t ,MKTt)
Conditional betas estimated using 6-month short window regressions, bMKTi,t , are used as proxies
for the true conditional betas, βMKTi,t , and the realized excess returns on the market over the
6-month windows, RMt, are used as proxies for the conditional market premiums, MKTt.
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Similarly for the other factors. To calculate the 6-month realized returns on the factors I first
consider the long and short sides of the portfolio separately, and compound their daily return
observations to reach their respective 6-month returns. I then subtract the 6-month return on
the short position from the 6-month return on the long position to result in an accurate value
for the 6-month return on the factor. For example with the SMB factor I calculate a time
series of 6-month returns on the big (B) portfolio, and subtract that from the time series of
6-month returns on the small (S) portfolio. The average conditional premia, e.g. ¯MKT , are
calculated as the arithmetic mean of the 6-month realized returns. The remaining quantities
that are required for equation [5] are all innocuous from an estimation perspective.
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This thesis has explored the relationship between economic fundamentals and stock prices via
three empirical studies. I have presented new evidence for limited arbitrage in global equity
markets, which is of major consequence to the task of measuring how economic fundamentals
affect security prices. I have demonstrated a link between loadings on the Fama-French factors
and firm-level default, which implies a relationship between priced aggregate macroeconomic
risks and the financial performance of individual firms. Finally, I examined how frictions in
financial markets alter the predictions of the most famous model in finance, the CAPM.
Since arbitrage is limited the implication is that despite the presence of rational arbi-
trageurs, sustained deviations from fundamental values can occur in security markets. Even if
arbitrageurs agree on which model rationally prices securities as a function of economic fun-
damentals, there is no guarantee that the model’s predictions will hold empirically. Moreover,
this fact makes it more challenging to identify the model in the first place. This establishes a
caveat for any rational expectations model, and underlines the importance of research featuring
behavioural traders, such as DeLong et al (1990a). The importance of behavioural traders to
equilibrium prices could be one reason for the success of relative asset pricing models com-
pared to absolute pricing models. Limited arbitrage also has consequence for the debate on
financial regulation. It becomes harder to advocate an entirely unregulated free market if we
acknowledge that markets are not efficient.
Nonetheless the evidence that loadings on the SMB and HML factors are related to in-
cidence of firm-level default is consistent with a market where securities are rationally priced
according to macroeconomic risks. As suggested by Petkova (2006), Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001), Vassalou (2003) and Liew and Vassalou (2000), the SMB and HML portfolios are
sensitive to news about the future state of the economy and innovations to the investment
opportunity set. Here I demonstrate that stock returns are sensitive to these aggregate macroe-
conomic risks when their fundamental financial performance is poor and they are at risk of
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bankruptcy.
We also see how frictions can decisively alter the role of fundamentals in asset pricing.
The Betting-Against-Beta anomaly is so surprising because it runs completely contrary to
the prediction of the CAPM, which has a strong theoretical motivation relating expected
returns to economic fundamentals. The leverage-based explanation for Betting-Against-Beta
is corroborated by my findings, and this confirms that any simplifying assumptions used in
asset pricing theory must be tested. For example there is already a stream of literature which
uses short-sales restrictions to explain a variety of empirical phenomena, including Hong and
Sraer (2012), Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
I have explored the complexity of the relationship between economic fundamentals and stock
prices. The picture is one of security markets largely driven by aggregate macroeconomic risks
that are priced efficiently by rational arbitrageurs, but where sustained deviations occur due
to limited arbitrage and market frictions. Further research could focus on relaxing more of the
idealized assumptions behind asset pricing models, as well as further incorporating behavioural
phenomena into theoretical models, while attempting to balance parsimony and accuracy. It
would also be interesting to do more work relating the financial performance of firms directly
to the aggregate macroeconomic risk factors behind the SMB and HML portfolios.
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Figure 1: V1 OOS Mispricing Episodes for Chile.
114
Figure 2: V1 OOS Mispricing Episodes for Denmark.
115
Figure 3: V1 OOS Mispricing Episodes for Spain.
116
Figure 4: V1 OOS Mispricing Episodes for Finland.
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Figure 5: V1 OOS Mispricing Episodes for Hong Kong.
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Figure 6: V1 OOS Mispricing Episodes for Italy.
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Figure 7: V1 OOS Mispricing Episodes for Philippines.
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Figure 8: V1 OOS Mispricing Episodes for Sweden.
121
Figure 9: V1 OOS Mispricing Episodes for Thailand.
122
Figure 10: Histogram of Price Refresh Rates.
The refresh rate is the proportion of non-zero daily return observations in the 250-day window used to
estimate OLS 4-factor betas for a given firm-month. This histogram uses the pooled refresh rates for all
firm-months in the unfiltered full-sample (D4).
123
Figure 11: Histogram of HML Betas for D1.
These histograms compare the winsorized βHML for the default firm-months vs. the non-default firm-
months, using a sample that excludes low price shares (D1).
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Figure 12: Histogram of HML Betas for D2.
These histograms compare the winsorized βHML for the default firm-months vs. the non-default firm-
months, using a sample that includes low price shares (D2).
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Figure 13: Histogram of Market Betas for D1.
These histograms compare the winsorized βMkt for the default firm-months vs. the non-default firm-
months, using a sample that excludes low price shares (D1).
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Figure 14: Histogram of Market Betas for D2.
These histograms compare the winsorized βMkt for the default firm-months vs. the non-default firm-
months, using a sample that includes low price shares (D2).
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Figure 15: Histogram of SMB Betas for D1.
These histograms compare the winsorized βSMB for the default firm-months vs. the non-default firm-
months, using a sample that excludes low price shares (D1).
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Figure 16: Histogram of SMB Betas for D2.
These histograms compare the winsorized βSMB for the default firm-months vs. the non-default firm-
months, using a sample that includes low price shares (D2).
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Figure 17: SVM Probability of Default for E1D1 as a Function of HML Beta.
An SVM was fitted using a Gaussian kernel and the full specification of explanatory variables (E1) applied
to a sample of firm-months that excludes low price shares (D1). This graph shows the SVM predicted prob-
ability of default as a function of βHML, holding the other explanatory variables fixed at their winsorized
medians. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic.
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Figure 18: SVM Probability of Default for E1D1 as a Function of MKT Beta.
An SVM was fitted using a Gaussian kernel and the full specification of explanatory variables (E1) applied
to a sample of firm-months that excludes low price shares (D1). This graph shows the SVM predicted prob-
ability of default as a function of βMKT , holding the other explanatory variables fixed at their winsorized
medians. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic.
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Figure 19: SVM Probability of Default for E1D1 as a Function of SMB Beta.
An SVM was fitted using a Gaussian kernel and the full specification of explanatory variables (E1) applied
to a sample of firm-months that excludes low price shares (D1). This graph shows the SVM predicted prob-
ability of default as a function of βSMB , holding the other explanatory variables fixed at their winsorized
medians. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic.
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Figure 20: SVM Probability of Default for E1D2 as a Function of HML Beta.
An SVM was fitted using a Gaussian kernel and the full specification of explanatory variables (E1) applied
to a sample of firm-months that includes low price shares (D2). This graph shows the SVM predicted prob-
ability of default as a function of βHML, holding the other explanatory variables fixed at their winsorized
medians. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic.
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Figure 21: SVM Probability of Default for E1D2 as a Function of MKT Beta.
An SVM was fitted using a Gaussian kernel and the full specification of explanatory variables (E1) applied
to a sample of firm-months that includes low price shares (D2). This graph shows the SVM predicted prob-
ability of default as a function of βMKT , holding the other explanatory variables fixed at their winsorized
medians. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic.
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Figure 22: SVM Probability of Default for E1D2 as a Function of SMB Beta.
An SVM was fitted using a Gaussian kernel and the full specification of explanatory variables (E1) applied
to a sample of firm-months that includes low price shares (D2). This graph shows the SVM predicted prob-
ability of default as a function of βSMB , holding the other explanatory variables fixed at their winsorized
medians. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic.
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Figure 23: SVM Probability of Default for E1D2 as a Function of Weekly HML Beta.
An SVM was fitted using a Gaussian kernel and the full specification of explanatory variables (E1) applied
to a sample of firm-months that includes low price shares (D2). In this version, the 4-factor betas and
SIGMA(e) were estimated using weekly returns, to correct for non-synchronous data. This graph shows
the SVM predicted probability of default as a function of βHML, holding the other explanatory variables
fixed at their winsorized medians. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic.
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Figure 24: SVM Probability of Default for E1D2 as a Function of Weekly MKT Beta.
An SVM was fitted using a Gaussian kernel and the full specification of explanatory variables (E1) applied
to a sample of firm-months that includes low price shares (D2). In this version, the 4-factor betas and
SIGMA(e) were estimated using weekly returns, to correct for non-synchronous data. This graph shows
the SVM predicted probability of default as a function of βMKT , holding the other explanatory variables
fixed at their winsorized medians. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic.
137
Figure 25: SVM Probability of Default for E1D2 as a Function of Weekly SMB Beta.
An SVM was fitted using a Gaussian kernel and the full specification of explanatory variables (E1) applied
to a sample of firm-months that includes low price shares (D2). In this version, the 4-factor betas and
SIGMA(e) were estimated using weekly returns, to correct for non-synchronous data. This graph shows
the SVM predicted probability of default as a function of βSMB , holding the other explanatory variables
fixed at their winsorized medians. ROC denotes the Receiver Operating Characteristic.
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Figure 26: Number of Firms in Sample for V1.
This graph shows the number of NSYE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms in CRSP that have at least six
months of market price observations, and 75% or more non-zero daily return observations over the six
months leading up to time t. These criteria were used to choose the sample for V1, as a way to control for
non-synchronous data issues.
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